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The 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill caused extensive natural resource 
damage to the Prince William Sound. Lawsuits addressing this 
natural resource damage resulted in a settlement that required 
Exxon to pay $900 million over time to trustees charged with 
spending this money to restore the damaged environment of the 
Sound and nearby areas.  The settlement included a “Reopener 
Clause,” which pledges Exxon to spend an additional $100 million 
to fund restoration or rehabilitation of resources whose injuries 
were not foreseeable in 1989.  This Article urges the State of 
Alaska and the United States to seek enforcement of the Reopener 
Clause, to restore natural resources and Native subsistence uses 
that were not addressed in the initial settlement and have not re-
covered from the Exxon Valdez oil spill.  Alternatively, this Arti-
cle urges Native entities to intervene in the case and seek enforce-
ment of the Reopener Clause.   
 
Copyright © 2005 William H. Rodgers, Jr., J.B. Crosetto III, C.A. Holley, T.C. 
Kade, J.H. Kaufman, C.M. Kostelec, K.A. Michael, R.J. Sandberg, and J.L. 
Schorr. 
This Article is also available on the Internet at http://www.law.duke.edu/ 
journals/alr. 
 * Stimson Bullitt Professor of Environmental Law, University of Washing-
ton.  Professor Rodgers teaches environmental law, law and biology, and oceans 
and coastal law.  His research interests include the subjects of law, biology, human 
behavior, and environmental law in Indian country.  This Article was written in 
conjunction with the Winter 2005 Seminar on Natural Resource Damages at the 
University of Washington, School of Law. 
110805 02_RODGERS.DOC 1/3/2006  4:49 PM 
136 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [22:2 
 
 
 
This was the largest oil spill ever to have occurred in U.S. waters 
and the largest anywhere this far north.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Prince William Sound, Alaska, lost its innocence in March of 
1989 when the tanker Exxon Valdez went aground on Bligh Reef.  
This terrible spill killed more birds, contaminated more shoreline, 
covered more water, spawned more lawsuits, and ruined more lives 
than any oil spill in the history of this continent.2 
The spill was so big that experts cannot agree on its volume, 
though it was clearly the largest spill in the United States.  Exxon’s 
figure, 10.8 million gallons, ranks it Number 34 in the “Top 65 
Spills Worldwide,” but more recent calculations—up to 30 million 
gallons—would bump it to Number 15 on the list.3  The spill’s geo-
graphic reach is more obvious: oil reached to the far corners of 
Prince William Sound and way down the Alaska Peninsula.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1. Symposium, The Effects of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill on the Alaskan 
Coastal Environment, 1996 AM. FISHERIES SOC’Y SYMP. 18 (1996) (on file with 
author). 
 2. ALASKA OIL SPILL COMM’N, SPILL: THE WRECK OF THE EXXON VALDEZ 1, 
5 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 OIL SPILL REPORT] (contaminated 1,244 miles of coast-
line); see also Robert E. Jenkins & Jill Watry Kastner, Running Aground in a Sea 
of Complex Litigation: A Case Comment on the Exxon Valdez Litigation, 18 
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 151, 153, 167 (1999–2000) (250,000 birds killed and 
330 lawsuits); Steve Keeva, After the Spill, 77 Feb. A.B.A.J. 66, 66 (1991) (181 
separate suits in state and federal courts, over 75 law firms); Miles Tolbert, The 
Public as Plaintiff: Public Nuisance and Federal Citizen Suits in the Exxon Valdez 
Litigation, 14 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 511, 511 n.1 (1990) (within a month the oil 
had covered 1,000 square miles of state land and waters and 1,300 claims were 
filed). 
 3. Compare 1990 OIL SPILL REPORT, supra note 2, at 86 (listing top 65 spills) 
with RIKI OTT, SOUND TRUTH AND CORPORATE MYTH$: THE LEGACY OF THE 
EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL 4–5 (2005) (estimating volume of 30 million gallons). 
 4. OTT, supra note 3, at xx (map displaying spread of oil from Mar. 24, 1989 
to June 20, 1989). 
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Figure 1. Spill: The Wreck of the Exxon Valdez, Alaska Oil Spill 
Commission Final Report, State of Alaska, February 1990, p. 62. 
Despite its extensiveness, the lawsuits addressing the natural 
resources damage were settled amicably.  On October 8, 1991 
Judge H. Russel Holland approved a settlement among Exxon, the 
United States, and the State of Alaska.5  The agreement required 
Exxon to pay $900 million over time to natural resources “trus-
tees,” identified in the settlement documents as the United States 
and the State of Alaska.6  The Trustee Council, composed of three 
appointees of the United States and three from Alaska, would 
 
 5. [Consolidated] Agreement and Consent Decree, United States v. Exxon 
Corp., Nos. A91-081-083 CV ¶¶ 6, 8 (D. Alaska, Oct. 9, 1991) [hereinafter Oct. 
1991 Consent Decree]. 
 6. Id. ¶¶ 8, 6(f). 
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spend this money to restore the damaged environment of Prince 
William Sound and nearby areas.7 
Part of the inducement for this settlement was the so-called 
“Reopener clause,” titled in the Agreement and Consent Decree as 
a “Reopener for Unknown Injury.”  This clause reads: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, between 
September 1, 2002, and September 1, 2006, Exxon shall pay to 
the Governments such additional sums as are required for the 
performance of restoration projects in Prince William Sound and 
other areas affected by the Oil Spill to restore one or more popu-
lations, habitats or species which, as a result of the Oil Spill, have 
suffered a substantial loss or substantial decline in the areas af-
fected by the Oil Spill; provided, however, that for a restoration 
project to qualify for payment under this paragraph the project 
must meet the following requirements: 
(a) the cost of a restoration project must not be grossly dis-
proportionate to the magnitude of the benefits antici-
pated from the remediation; and 
(b) the injury to the affected population, habitat, or species 
could not reasonably have been known nor could it rea-
sonably have been anticipated by any Trustee from any 
information in the possession of or reasonably available 
to any trustee on the Effective Date.8 
Resort to the Reopener is constrained by a filing requirement: 
The Governments shall file with Exxon, 90 days before demand-
ing any payment pursuant to Paragraph 17, detailed plans for all 
such restoration projects, together with a statement of all 
amounts they claim should be paid under Paragraph 17 and all 
information upon which they relied in the preparation of the res-
toration plan and the accompanying cost statement.9 
The Reopener helped seal the settlement.  The governments 
told Judge Holland that it was an important hedge against miscal-
culations or excessive optimism, fueled by the desire to settle 
quickly.10  Early in the settlement process, Alaska and the federal 
 
 7. The provision also provides for reimbursement of legal costs.  Id. ¶ 10; see 
also EVOS TRUSTEE COUNCIL, EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL RESTORATION PLAN 5 
(Nov. 1994), available at http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/pdf/restoration/restoration 
plan.pdf [hereinafter RESTORATION PLAN]. 
 8. Oct. 1991 Consent Decree, supra note 5, at ¶ 17. 
 9. Id. ¶ 19. 
 10. Governments’ Mem. in Support of Agreement and Consent Decree at 12, 
United States v. Exxon Corp., No. A91-082 CV (D. Alaska 1991), available at 
http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/pdf/settlement/gov_memo100891.pdf [hereinafter 
1991 Gov’t Consent Decree Mem.] (applauding the “novel” Reopener provision 
and stating strict liability standard: “Exxon commits to pay up to $100 million for 
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government announced they were looking for at least $1 billion in 
damages.11  Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) Adminis-
trator William Reilly “insisted” that the agreement contain $300 
million in a special compensation fund for additional, later-
discovered damage to natural resources.12  This demand underlies 
the Reopener clause in the final settlement agreement, and was 
opposed by Exxon executives from the start—the settlement nego-
tiations nearly ran aground because of Mr. Reilly’s insistence on 
the Reopener.13  Exxon and Mr. Reilly compromised on a dimin-
ished Reopener, requiring Exxon to pay up to $100 million after 
2001, if necessary.14 
This Article urges the State of Alaska and the United States to 
seek enforcement of the Reopener clause.  To date, neither Alaska 
nor the federal government have requested any of the $100 million 
Exxon may be required to pay to compensate for additional dam-
ages resulting from the oil spill.  We offer extended comment on 
this most famous of all natural resource damage cases.  Special at-
tention will be paid to legal roads not taken. 
II.  ROADS NOT TAKEN 
A. The Third Trustee: A Missing Tribal Presence 
1. Natural Resource Damages at Common Law.  Modern 
natural resource damages (“NRD”) law is rooted in the common 
law public trust and parens patriae doctrines.  The “public trust” 
doctrine arose in the 1892 Illinois Central case,15 and supports the 
idea that public resources must not be lost.16  The Alaska Constitu-
tion similarly reflects an understanding of the common ownership 
and stewardship of natural resources.17 
 
restoration of unanticipated environmental harm, without any need for the Gov-
ernments to establish Exxon’s liability.”). 
 11. Keith Schneider, In Exxon Deal, Transportation Chief Wins Another One 
for the President, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1991, at A18. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 458 (1892). 
 16. See id. 
 17. See ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 3 (“[w]herever occurring in their natural 
state, fish, wildlife and waters are reserved for the people for common use”); see 
also Gregory F. Cook, The Public Trust Doctrine in Alaska, 8 J. ENVTL L. & LITIG. 
1, 5 (1993) (arguing that the Alaska Constitution implicitly adopts the public trust 
doctrine). 
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Parens patriae, “parent of the country,” protects the public 
trust by granting states standing to sue as guardians of natural re-
sources.18  A leading case, Georgia v. Tennessee Copper,19 recog-
nized a state’s quasi-sovereign interest in protecting its environ-
ment for its citizens: “[T]he state has an interest independent of 
and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its 
domain.  It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be 
stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air.”20 
Another powerful underpinning of natural resource protection 
is the Indian trust doctrine.21  Because of history, tradition, religion, 
and cultural beliefs, the Native voice is often Nature’s voice: 
Every part of this soil is sacred . . . Every hillside, every valley, 
every plain and grove, has been hallowed by some sad or happy 
event in days long vanished.  Even the rocks, which seem to be 
dumb and dead as they swelter in the sun along the silent shore, 
thrill with memories of stirring events connected with lives of my 
people, and the very dust upon which you now stand responds 
more lovingly to their footsteps than to yours, because it is rich 
with the blood of our ancestors and our bare feet are conscious 
of the sympathetic touch . . . .22 
The common law does not isolate who can speak for nature.  
There are at least three government voices (federal, state, and 
tribal), and sometimes many others.  Moreover, nothing in the 
common law origins of NRD statutes eschews prevention in favor 
of restitution. 
2. Federal Natural Resource Damages Statutes.  Natural re-
source damages statutes build on these common law foundations, 
authorizing the federal government, states, and Indian tribes to act 
as trustees.  The main statutes addressing hazardous substance 
spills are the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA” or “Superfund”)23 and 
 
 18. See generally Note, State Protection of Its Economy and Environment: 
Parens Patriae Suits for Damages, 6 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 411 (1970). 
 19. 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Mary Christina Wood, The Indian Trust Responsibility: Protecting Tribal 
Lands and Resources Through Claims of Injunctive Relief Against Government 
Agencies, 39 TULSA L. REV. 355, 368 (2003) (“The Indian trust doctrine is perhaps 
the only source of law that can protect the natural landscapes, animals, and waters 
that sustain tribalism.”). 
 22. W.C. VANDERWERTH, INDIAN ORATORY: FAMOUS SPEECHES BY NOTED 
INDIAN CHIEFTAINS 121–22 (1971) (statement of Chief Seattle, Suquamish-
Duwamish Indian). 
 23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9628 (2000). 
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the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA”).24  The tribal presence is 
confirmed in each.25 
Superfund addresses the clean-up of hazardous substances and 
counts NRD among recoverable response costs.26  It specifies clean-
up responsibilities and techniques.  Superfund also makes clear that 
sums recovered as NRD by the United States or any state—but not 
by a tribe—are available “for use only to restore, replace, or ac-
quire the equivalent” of natural resources.27 
OPA was a direct Congressional response to the Exxon Valdez 
spill, and it brought oil under the CERCLA regime.28  It also de-
fines “natural resources” to include tribal interests,29 and it unmis-
takably includes subsistence use among the recoverable elements in 
an oil spill damages action: “[d]amages for loss of subsistence use 
of natural resources, which shall be recoverable by any claimant 
who so uses natural resources which have been injured, destroyed, 
or lost, without regard to the ownership or management of the re-
sources.”30 
OPA details the extent of liability to NRD trustees, the dam-
ages’ designation, and the damages’ function.31  Section 1006 re-
quires all three trustees to “develop and implement a plan for the 
restoration, rehabilitation, replacement, or acquisition of the 
equivalent” of the natural resources under their trusteeship.32 
3. Tribes Left Out.  Notwithstanding Superfund and OPA’s 
clear inclusion of Indian interests, tribes were left out of the 1991 
settlement because the Exxon Valdez claims were brought under 
 
 24. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2728 (2000). 
 25. For instance, Superfund defines “natural resources” to include “land, fish, 
wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water supplies, and other such 
resources belonging to, managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise 
controlled by the United States . . . any Indian tribe, or, if such resources are sub-
ject to a trust restriction on alienation, any member of an Indian tribe.”  42 U.S.C. 
§ 9601(16) (2000).  In contrast, the Clean Water Act lists only federal and state 
governments as trustees.  33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(4).  For a review of the case law, see 
Gordon J. Johnson, Natural Resource Damages Under CERCLA, OPA and CWA, 
SD28 ALI-ABA 333, 338 (1998); Peter M. Manus, Natural Resource Damages 
from Rachel Carson’s Perspective: A Rite of Spring in American Environmental-
ism, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 381 (1995–96). 
 26. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2000). 
 27. § 9607(f)(1). 
 28. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2000). 
 29. OPA’s definition mirrors CERCLA’s.  See § 2701(20). 
 30. § 2702(b)(2)(C). 
 31. § 2706. 
 32. §§ 2706(c)(1)(C), (2)(B), (3)(B). 
110805 02_RODGERS.DOC 1/3/2006  4:49 PM 
142 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [22:2 
the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), whose 1977 amendments use the 
older, federal-and-state-only, trustee model.33  Though tribes may 
be treated as states, they were not sua sponte brought in by any 
federal or state plaintiffs.34  This outcome can be attributed to the 
conflict in Alaska over the status of Indian country, tribes, and the 
United States’ trust duty.35  In short, despite the tribes’ great inter-
est, none of the settlement parties wanted to include them. 
4. Alaska Native Villages and Tribes Hardest Hit. 
Never in the millennium of our tradition have we thought it pos-
sible for the water to die.36 
As the first oiled birds and otters appeared, “many of the Port 
Graham women went down to the beach, even though the 
weather was stormy.  Going out in a skiff at that evening’s low 
tide, they collected the prized and nutritious clam-like ‘bidarkies’ 
in the fading light. . . . That night they shucked and cleaned the 
bidarkies and gave each family in the village one bagful, knowing 
these might be the last for years to come.”37 
The omission of a tribal presence on the Exxon Valdez Trustee 
Council was not due to the spill’s chance neglect of village and 
tribal resources.  Alaska Natives are the largest private landowners 
 
 33. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(4)–(5). 
 34. The spill was in 1989; in the 1987 CWA amendments, tribes won the right 
to be treated as “states” for various water pollution programs.  See 33 U.S.C. § 
1377(e) (2000).  However, this right apparently did not extend to § 1321, the NRD 
provisions.  See William H. Rodgers, Jr., Treatment as Tribe, Treatment as State: 
The Penobscot Indians and the Clean Water Act, 55 ALA. L. REV. 815, 818 (2004). 
 35. See Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 523–24 
(1998) (describing how the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (“ANCSA”) 
extinguished federal supervision over Indian affairs and resolved land claims by 
Alaska Natives).  Notwithstanding this precedent, commentators recognize a tribal 
presence and the existence of a trust duty.  See DAVID S. CASE & DAVID A. 
VOLUCK, ALASKA NATIVES AND AMERICAN LAWS 95–98 (2d. ed. 2002) [hereinaf-
ter CASE & VOLUCK].  Prior to Venetie’s interpretation of ANCSA, many com-
mentators assumed a trust duty existed.  See id. at 111–13 (ed. 1984) (four-part 
analysis of trust responsibility discussing Native lands, human services, subsis-
tence, and self-government); FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN 
LAW 220–28 (1982 ed.); G. Kevin Jones, Black Gold and the Tlingit Indian Village 
of Yakutat, Alaska: A Case Study of Alaska’s Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas 
Resources and the Federal Trust Responsibility to Native Alaskans, 24 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 565 (1988). 
 36. 1990 OIL SPILL REPORT, supra note 2, at iv (quoting Water Meganinick, 
Sr., traditional village chief, Port Graham, in the wake of the spill). 
 37. Id. at 74–75. 
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in Prince William Sound.38  The Chugach Alaska Corporation is 
“owned” by approximately 2,000 Native shareholders,39 and within 
the region are twenty Native villages, including Chenega Bay, Eng-
lish Bay, Eyak, Port Graham, and Tatitlek.40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Map Illustrating the Twenty Communities Affected by 
the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill. Courtesy of Dr. Usha Varanashi. 
The massive news coverage of the spill mostly overlooked the 
Native story, focusing instead on a disaster narrative, turning 
quickly to the crimal aspects of the spill, and then emphasizing the 
environmental impact.41  By contrast, on the pages of the Tundra 
Times, the Native newspaper, ten of ten oil spill stories in April of 
1989 emphasized the “subsistence narrative,” i.e., that “the very 
environment that gave them life could be dying.”42 
 
 38. Patrick Daley with Dan O’Neill, “Sad is Too Mild a Word”: Press Cover-
age of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, J. COMM. 42, 42 (1991). 
 39. Id. at 50. 
 40. Dr. Usha Varanasi, Science & Research Director, Northwest Fisheries 
Science Center, NOAA, Presentation to NRD Seminar, Univ. of Wash. Sch. of 
Law (Feb. 2005) (on file with author). 
 41. Daley, supra note 38, at 50 (using ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS and THE 
BOSTON GLOBE as mainstream barometers). 
 42. Id. at 50, 51. 
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5. Chenega Bay Settlement.  Native groups opposed the 1991 
settlement, objecting to the extent to which damage assessment in-
formation was made publicly available, the adequacy of compensa-
tion, and the absence of civil penalties.43  Notably, however, no Na-
tive group in 1991 sought or demanded to become party to the fed-
eral-state-Exxon settlement.  Further, in 1989-1991, no tribes were 
federally recognized, and thus they could be overlooked in the legal 
calculus.44  One of the most active and effective groups in agitating 
against the settlement bowed out with a settlement of its own, in 
the case of Native Village of Chenega Bay v. United States.45  
Among other things, this settlement required Native groups to 
withdraw and waive any NRD claims arising from the spill, and 
stipulated that the federal and state governments could exclude 
Native groups from acting as trustees.46 
Although it was not an ideal settlement for Native plaintiffs, 
they were assured access to governmental research on spill damage, 
which was held confidential in anticipation of a huge NRD lawsuit 
that was never filed.47  In addition, the Chenega Bay plaintiffs won 
the right to sue for monetary damages for cultural and subsistence 
losses.48  However, this right proved worthless.  When the Alaska 
Natives sued to recover damages for injuries to their “subsistence 
way of life,” the Alaska District Court dismissed their claim, hold-
ing that Alaska’s general population has a right to pursue a subsis-
tence lifestyle.49  The Chenega Bay settlement also anticipated that 
Native interests would be protected fully by the Trustee Council.  
This reliance was mistaken. 
These fundamental legal disappointments, in retrospect, are 
reasons to look more attentively at the Reopener clause. 
 
 43. See 1991 Gov’t Consent Decree Mem., supra note 10, at 24 (listing seven 
categories of written objections to the consent decree). 
 44. Geoffrey D. Strommer & Stephen D. Osborne, “Indian Country” and the 
Nature and Scope of Tribal Self-Government in Alaska, 22 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 4–6 
(2005). 
 45. Consent Decree and Stipulation of Dismissal, Native Vill. of Chenega Bay 
v. United States, No. A91-454 CV (D. Alaska, Sept. 24, 1991) [hereinafter 
Chenega Consent Decree]. 
 46. Id. at ¶ 8. 
 47. On the conflicts over the “confidential” treatment of early research data, 
see OTT, supra note 3, at 206–07. 
 48. Chenega Consent Decree, supra note 45, at ¶¶ 7–9. 
 49. In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-095 CV, 1994 WL 182856, at *2 (D. Alaska 
Mar. 23, 1994) (“The Alaska Natives do not have a viable, maritime, public nui-
sance claim, as their claim is only different in degree, but not in kind, from that 
suffered by the general population of Alaska.”). 
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6. Tribal Intervention to Enforce the Reopener.  Would it be 
possible at this late date for Alaska tribes to intervene in the NRD 
cases, for purposes of enforcing the Reopener?  We think so. 
This would not be the first attempt.  In 1995, the non-profit 
Coastal Coalition sought permissive intervention for the purpose of 
establishing a post-decree monitor for the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill 
(“EVOS”) Trustee Council.50  The federal government opposed the 
motion, arguing that: (1) it was untimely because there was no 
“live” case; (2) there was no common question of law or fact as re-
quired for permissive intervention under Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 24(b); (3) the Coastal Coalition presented no independent 
basis for jurisdiction, as required by Rule 24, to review Executive 
Branch restoration decisions; and (4) the Coastal Coalition had no 
standing to intervene because only third-party beneficiaries have 
non-party rights to enforce the terms of a consent decree. 51  Fur-
thermore, the federal government argued that, where it is party to a 
consent decree, it alone, on behalf of the public, may seek en-
forcement of the decree’s provisions.52 
Though the district court denied the Coastal Coalition’s mo-
tion, it was not a full denial.53  The court did not address the issue of 
standing; rather, the court found it lacked jurisdiction to order the 
creation of a Review Commission.54  But the court also held that 
the Coalition’s motion was timely filed, a review of the trustees’ 
activities would not unduly prejudice the parties, and common 
questions of law and fact existed between the motions to intervene 
and the main action.55  With regard to jurisdiction, the court held 
that OPA did not apply but that independent jurisdiction might be 
found under Title 28, Section 1367 of the United States Code (sup-
plemental jurisdiction).56  Though the motion was denied, “the 
 
 50. Mot. to Intervene by Coastal Coalition, United States v. Exxon Corp., No. 
A91-082 CV (D. Alaska, Mar. 29, 1995). 
 51. Opposition of the United States to the Coastal Coalition’s Mot. to Inter-
vene, United States v. Exxon Corp., No. A91-082 CV, at 3 (D. Alaska, Apr. 18, 
1995) [hereinafter Apr. 1995 Opposition Motion]. 
 52. Id. at 12. 
 53. Order (Mot. to Intervene), United States v. Exxon Corp., No. A91-082 
CV, at 9 (D. Alaska, May 17, 1995). 
 54. Id. at 7.  In the Exxon Valdez consent decree, the district court retained 
jurisdiction over the implementation and enforcement of the agreement.  Oct. 
1991 Consent Decree, supra note 5, at ¶ 38. 
 55. Order (Mot. to Intervene), United States v. Exxon Corp., No. A91-082 
CV, at 6 (D. Alaska, May 17, 1995). 
 56. Id. at 7. 
110805 02_RODGERS.DOC 1/3/2006  4:49 PM 
146 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [22:2 
court [was] not unsympathetic with the Coastal Coalition’s con-
cerns”57—perhaps the future will hold a more favorable decision. 
An Alaskan tribe should be entitled to intervene under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, if: (1) the tribe claims an interest 
related to settlement, (2) the failure to intervene impairs its ability 
to protect that interest, and (3) the interest has not been ade-
quately represented by the federal or state government.58  These 
requirements should be easy to meet.  The United States and the 
State of Alaska have not yet pursued the Reopener,59 and an inter-
vener need only show that representation on its behalf “may be” 
inadequate.60  The tribes were not recognized at the time of the set-
tlement; they have not benefited from direct settlements or EVOS 
projects.61  Given the low prima facie inadequacy threshold, tribal 
intervention could at least shift the burden to the governments to 
prove they adequately represented tribal interests—that the ar-
rangement with Exxon was no sweetheart deal—and that there are 
no scientific grounds for invoking the Reopener. 
Exxon will surely challenge the timeliness of tribal interven-
tion, but under the circumstances, there could hardly be a more 
appropriate time.  The timeliness of a motion to intervene “is to be 
determined from all the circumstances.”62  The tribe must then 
show why it is not too late, that Exxon and the governments will 
not be prejudiced thereby, and that there are legitimate reasons 
why the tribe did not intervene earlier.63 
As to the first element, though Exxon has made the last of its 
settlement payments, the case may still be pending because the Re-
opener window has not closed.  Since the Reopener provides for 
unforeseen damages, and tribes can show such damages are real 
and will be relevant for decades to come, there seems to be no 
more fitting time to intervene than the present. 
 
 57. Id. at 8. 
 58. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24. 
 59. See, e.g., Jim Carlton, Groups Seek to Increase Bill for Exxon Spill, WALL 
ST. J., Aug. 30, 2001, at B4; Lila Guterman, Slippery Science, 5 CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC., Sept. 24, 2004, at A12. 
 60. Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 528 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 61. According to the founder and director of the Eyak Preservation Council, 
“the government said[,] if you want a restoration program, or if you would like us 
to preserve or protect your Native land, you have to sell it to us.”  Dune Lankard, 
Sacred Places: Indian Rights After the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 10 FORDHAM 
ENVTL. L. REV. 371, 375 (1999). 
 62. NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 366 (1973). 
 63. See United States v. Alisal Water Corp., 370 F.3d 915, 921 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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As to the delay, the governments’ inaction as the Reopener 
deadline looms makes a compelling argument for granting inter-
vention.  The original consent decree is unmistakable in its design 
not to affect or impair the “rights and obligations, if any, of Alaska 
Native villages to act as trustees for the purposes of asserting and 
compromising claims” for NRDs resulting from the spill.64  The 
burden was ultimately upon Exxon, the United States, and Alaska 
to join additional parties in order to ensure the judgment’s binding 
effect.65  With an approaching deadline, no ability to sue directly, 
and no sign from the governments of imminent joinder, interven-
tion may be the tribes’ last chance for a day in court. 
Additionally, for a motion to intervene to succeed, the tribe 
must demonstrate that invoking the Reopener serves tribal inter-
ests.  This should be simple—tribes could develop (and some have) 
a restoration plan worthy of the Reopener opportunity.  Alterna-
tively, a tribe could seek representation on the EVOS Council as a 
trustee.  From there, a tribe might demand, for example, that 
money be spent on a study of how to best invest additional Re-
opener money. 
An alternative to intervention is a tribal suit against the 
United States under the All Writs Act66 for a mandamus order 
compelling enforcement of the consent decree’s terms.  When the 
conditions for invoking the Reopener are fully met, the govern-
ment has a duty to invoke it.  A line of cases in the Sixth Circuit 
confirms judicial authority to enforce a consent decree’s terms 
against a non-party, if that party has frustrated the purposes of the 
decree or the administration of justice.67  Here, if the federal gov-
ernment refuses to invoke the Reopener, and the Reopener is 
deemed necessary to fulfill the settlement goals, its conduct would 
frustrate the decree’s purposes.  It is not implausible that a non-
party with an interest in the judgment could move the court for en-
forcement of the decree’s terms, when a party fails to do so. 
Finally, we believe the Indian trust doctrine is operative in 
Alaska.  The federal responsibility towards Indians, according to 
the Department of the Interior, “is a legally enforceable fiduciary 
obligation, on the part of the United States, to protect tribal lands, 
assets, resources, and treaty rights, as well as a duty to carry out the 
 
 64. Mem. of Agreement and Consent Decree, IV(C)(1), United States v. 
Alaska, A91-081 CV (D. Alaska Oct. 28, 1991). 
 65. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19. 
 66. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000). 
 67. See United States v. City of Detroit, 329 F.3d 515 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc), 
vacated as moot, 401 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 2005) (but specifically preserving this as-
pect of the holding). 
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mandates of federal law with respect to American Indian and 
Alaska Native tribes.”68  It is difficult to imagine how any version of 
this trust doctrine can be reconciled with a federal decision to leave 
ample amounts of oil on the properties and subsistence resources 
of Alaska Natives, while neglecting to compel delivery of money 
set out to fix the problem. 
B. Disapproval of 1991 Settlement 
In theory, Judge Holland could have disapproved the 1991 set-
tlement and sent the litigation in a somewhat different direction, 
but practically, given the politics and pressures of the spill, this op-
tion was not available.  In approving settlement, a court weighs 
whether the proposal is procedurally and substantively fair, reason-
able, and compatible with underlying statutory goals.69  Within 
these general contours hide a host of particulars, including whether 
the settlement is a product of arms-length negotiations, is reflective 
of uncertainties and litigation risks, or is convincing on its face.70 
The Exxon Valdez spill was a legal nightmare, as well as an 
ecological and economic disaster.  Within hours of the catastrophe, 
Exxon was laying the groundwork for multiple assignments of 
blame and potential liability for the United States and Alaska, ren-
dering settlement more attractive to these government actors.71  
Further complicating the situation, baseline data for a pristine 
Prince William Sound would never be available (despite heroic ef-
forts to secure it).72  Thus, pre-litigation science was controversial 
 
 68. See Dep’t of Interior, Office of American Indian Trust, American Indians 
and Alaska Natives, https://www.denix.osd.mil/denix/Public/Native/Outreach/ 
American/indian.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2005).  Others have defined it similarly as 
“federal responsibility to protect or enhance tribal assets (including fiscal, natural, 
human, and cultural resources) through policy decisions and management 
actions.”  DAVID E. WILKINS & K. TSIANINA LOMAWAIMA, UNEVEN GROUND: 
AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND FEDERAL LAW 65 (2001) (emphasis 
added).  For another discussion, see Mary C. Wood, Origins and Development of 
the Trust Responsibility: Paternalism or Protection?, Address before the Federal 
Bar Association 28th Annual Indian Law Conference (Apr. 10, 2003), http://www. 
law.uoregon.edu/faculty/mwood/docs/albequerque_trust_speech.pdf. 
 69. E.g., United States v. Fort James Operating Co., 313 F. Supp. 2d 902, 906 
(E.D. Wis. 2004). 
 70. See generally id. at 907–08 (analyzing a CERCLA consent decree). 
 71. See, e.g., 1990 OIL SPILL REPORT, supra note 2, at 17–18 (Exxon immedi-
ately requested permission to use dispersants but the governments resisted, impos-
ing a formal application requirement). 
 72. See OTT, supra note 3, at 251–53 (discussing the difficulties of obtaining 
baseline data for salmon). 
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and replete with competing, possibly misleading, studies.73  There 
were no functional rules for calculating NRD. Contingent valuation 
studies done on the damage to the Sound varied between $3 billion 
and $15 billion,74 but no one, not even federal litigators, had confi-
dence in these estimates.75 
Rather, conventional wisdom holds that the case was settled 
on the back of an envelope in Washington, D.C.  As the story goes, 
Governor Hickel demanded any settlement have a “B” in it.  Po-
tentially massive criminal penalties gave way to four misdemeanors 
and $25 million in fines.76  Of the $1.25 billion in civil damages, 
fines, and restitution, $125 million was “remitted” and vanished in 
an accounting gesture “in consideration” of the work Exxon had 
done in cleaning up the spill.77  Another $100 million was declared 
“restitution” and went to the federal government and the State of 
Alaska for “restoration projects” in Alaska.78  These amounts were 
subtracted from the NRD portion of the settlement, leaving the 
EVOS Trustee Council with $900 million.79 
The overall settlement was jeopardized by three particulars:  
the inadequacy of the criminal law disposition and its encroach-
ment on the NRD fund; the understatement of injuries being for-
given and resolved; and the invention of conditions on the Re-
opener without basis in law.  Only one of these objections was pre-
sented fully to Judge Holland. 
 
 73. Compare Carrie Gartner, The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: A Case Study in 
Institutional Apologia 71–72 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D Thesis, Cal. State Univ., 
Fullerton) (on file with author) (describing interference with collection of dead 
birds) with Guterman, supra note 59, at A12 (describing allegations of scientific 
fraud).  Compare also Charles H. Peterson et al., Sampling Design Begets Conclu-
sions: The Statistical Basis for Detection of Injury to and Recovery of Shoreline 
Communities After the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 210 MARINE ECOLOGY PROGRESS 
SERIES 255, 255–83 (2001) with Edward S. Gilfillan et al., Comment on Sampling 
Design Begets Conclusions, 231 MARINE ECOLOGY PROGRESS SERIES 303, 303–08 
(2002). 
 74. Gardner Brown, Group Meeting with NRD Seminar, Univ. of Wash. Sch. 
of Law (Feb. 2005) (on file with author); see also Michael Parrish, Secret Studies 
Put Spill Damage at $15 Billion, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1991, at Al. 
 75. Brown, supra note 74. 
 76. Michael Parrish, Exxon Reaches $1.1 Billion Spill Settlement Deal, L.A. 
TIMES, Oct. 1, 1991, at A1. 
 77. Id.  Exxon was called “a good corporate citizen” based on its actions after  
the spill.  Michael Parrish, Judge Approves $1.125 Billion Oil Spill Settlement, L.A. 
TIMES, Oct. 9, 1991, at A1. 
 78. Parrish, supra note 76, at A1. 
 79. See id. 
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1. The Criminal-Civil Case Confusion.  The Exxon Shipping 
Company and the Exxon Corporation faced five criminal charges 
as a result of the spill.  On February 27, 1990, the two entities were 
indicted and charged with felony violations of the Ports and Wa-
terways Act and the Dangerous Cargo Act, and with misdemeanor 
violations of the Clean Water Act, the Refuse Act, and the Migra-
tory Bird Treaty Act.80  By including claims under the Refuse and 
Migratory Bird Treaty Acts, the government was able to hold 
Exxon strictly liable for the spill, in a settlement-encouragement 
endeavor.81  In March 1991, Exxon Shipping agreed to plead guilty 
to all three misdemeanors, and the Exxon Corporation agreed to 
plead to the Migratory Bird Treaty Act misdemeanor.  The parties 
concluded that a $100 million criminal penalty was appropriate.82 
On April 24, 1991, federal district court Judge H. Russel Hol-
land rejected the $100 million plea agreement as insufficient.83  
Judge Holland declared the fines an inadequate deterrent: “I’m 
afraid these fines send the wrong message, suggesting that spills are 
a cost of business that can be absorbed.”84   
Of particular concern was Exxon’s lack of remorse regarding 
the impacts of the spill.  There was also concern that an approved 
settlement might have an adverse impact on the claims of the 
Alaska Natives.85  Part of the discovery process was designed to as-
certain if Exxon planned to use the government settlement to hin-
der potential claims by Alaska Natives.86  Exxon Chair Lawrence 
Rawl asserted that Exxon did not consider these claims during the 
settlement process;87 to shore up settlement negotiations with 
Exxon, federal and state authorities negotiated an agreement with 
the Chenega Bay plaintiffs and other Native groups whereby the 
governments reserved the exclusive right to recover for NRD on 
public lands, including those used for subsistence living, and the 
 
 80. See Ronald J. Ostrow, Exxon Agrees to Pay $1 Billion for Alaska Spill, 
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1991, at A1. 
 81. Stephen Raucher, Raising the Stakes for Environmental Polluters: The 
Exxon Valdez Criminal Prosecution, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 147, 148 (1992). 
 82. See Ostrow, supra note 80, at A1. 
 83. Patrick Lee, Exxon-Alaska Civil Oil Spill Pact Collapses, L.A. TIMES, May 
4, 1991, at A1; Alanna Sullivan et al., Judge Rejects Exxon Alaska-Spill Pact, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 1991, at A3. 
 84. Jenkins & Kastner, supra note 2, at 183 (quoting Keith Schneider, Judge 
Rejects $100 Million Fine for Exxon in Oil Spill as Too Low, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 
1991, at A1). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 184. 
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Native groups retained the right to pursue their private claims.88  
On September 25, 1991, Exxon and the governments signed a new 
settlement agreement that was subsequently approved by the 
Alaska Legislature and accepted by Judge Holland.89 
The approved settlement was strikingly similar to the earlier 
proposal, which was rejected as inadequate.90  This time, Judge Hol-
land commended Exxon for its efforts, calling Exxon a “good cor-
porate citizen.”91  The settlement included $150 million in fines, 
with $100 million for restitution to be split between the state and 
federal governments.92  However, Exxon paid only $25 million in 
fines to the North American Wetlands Conservation and the Vic-
tim Compensation and Assistance Act accounts.93  In consideration 
of Exxon’s cooperation in the clean-up, the court forgave $125 mil-
lion in criminal fines.94  Concurrently, the district court approved a 
civil settlement where Exxon would pay $900 million over ten 
years, plus an additional $100 million Reopener, if warranted, for 
environmental damages.95 
Notably, the civil and criminal components were closely 
linked.  Nine days after Judge Holland rejected the initial criminal 
settlement, Exxon and Alaska withdrew from civil settlement nego-
tiations.96  The Alaska House of Representatives supported Judge 
Holland’s decision, voting 27-13 to reject the settlement and to seek 
$1.2 billion: $700 million for civil claims and $500 million in crimi-
nal fines.97  While it is difficult to identify motives, some people 
were concerned about the impact of the settlement on the claims of 
non-participating parties, Alaska Natives in particular.98  From a 
legal strategy perspective, it made sense for Exxon to settle the 
criminal and civil claims simultaneously, with exchanges and trade-
offs crossing civil-criminal boundaries.  This conclusion is evi-
denced by the settlements being referred to as a single “$1.125 bil-
lion deal.”99 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Parrish, supra note 76, at A1. 
 91. Parrish, supra note 77, at A1. 
 92. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE (“GAO”), REP. NO. B-254199, USE OF EXXON 
VALDEZ OIL SPILL SETTLEMENT FUNDS 4 (1993). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Parrish, supra note 77, at A1. 
 96. Lee, supra note 83, at A1. 
 97. Id.; see Alaska House Rejects Exxon Deal, CHI. TRIB., May 3, 1991, at 3. 
 98. Jenkins & Kastner, supra note 2, at 183–84. 
 99. Parrish, supra note 76, at A1. 
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As for Exxon Valdez Captain Hazelwood’s fate, he was acquit-
ted on charges of driving a watercraft while intoxicated, reckless 
endangerment, and criminal mischief, but was convicted of negli-
gent discharge of oil.  Ultimately, he was sentenced to a $1,000 fine, 
$50,000 in reparations, and ninety days in jail.  The sentence was 
suspended in lieu of completing 1,000 hours of community ser-
vice.100 
2. The 1991 “Baseline” Document: Settling the Unknown.  
Anyone intent on activating the Reopener must look closely at the 
description of known effects at the time of the 1991 settlement.  
The provision in the October 1991 Consent Decree is denominated 
“Reopener for Unknown Injury” and applies only to damages that 
are now recoverable but could not have been reasonably known or 
anticipated in 1990-1991.101  Thus any inquiry turns to what was 
known and what could have been anticipated. 
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(“NOAA”) compiled a summary of studies into a preliminary esti-
mate (“Summary of Injuries”) caused by the Exxon Valdez oil 
spill.102  This document served as a foundation for the settlement 
negotiations, but it does not clearly state what was known or an-
ticipated in 1990-1991. 
Because of the biodiversity of Prince William Sound, this 
document was difficult to create—most of the studies were incon-
clusive as to the numbers of animals killed and even what species 
were affected.  It is not surprising that the spill’s potential long-
term effects were not fully articulated.  In many respects, investiga-
tion had barely begun when the report was published, two years 
after the spill.  NOAA labeled the document “preliminary,” imply-
 
 100. William A. Lovett, Exxon Valdez, Punitive Damages and Tort Reform, 38 
TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1071, 1085 (2003).  Originally, Superior Court Judge 
Karl Johnstone wanted Hazelwood to spend his community service hours hand-
scrubbing rocks in the affected areas. See CBS News, Exxon Valdez Restitution 
Paid, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/05/16/national/main509364.shtml (May 
16, 2002).  By 1999, when the eight-year appeals process ended and Hazelwood’s 
sentence was approved, the clean-up effort had been abandoned.  Id.  Instead, 
Hazelwood fulfilled his community service by clearing litter and working in a soup 
kitchen.  Exxon Valdez Captain Is Serving His Sentence in a Soup Kitchen, DODGE 
CITY DAILY GLOBE, June 23, 1999, available at http://www.dodgeglobe.com/sto-
ries/062399/new_exxon.shtml. 
 101. Oct. 1991 Consent Decree, supra note 5, at ¶ 17. 
 102. Summary of Injuries to Natural Resources as a Result of the Exxon Valdez 
Oil Spill, 56 Fed. Reg. 14,687 (Apr. 11, 1991). 
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ing a lack of reliable information for the purposes of litigation or 
settlement. 
The lack of a complete, accurate damages valuation suggests 
the political nature of the settlement.  At the same time, it rein-
forces the logic behind and need for the Reopener clause: govern-
ments were meant to revisit the claim later, after a full study of the 
damages.  Exxon, through payments to the Trustee Council, would 
fund the studies later to be used as evidence of further injury. 
Again, the Summary of Injuries was very preliminary; it openly 
stated that more time was needed to evaluate the oil spill dam-
ages.103  The document discussed thirty-two species, in addition to 
the intertidal and subtidal ecosystems and archaeological resource 
damage.  Of the thirty-two species, twenty-five needed further as-
sessment to determine the extent of harm.  The Summary of Inju-
ries explained the difficulty of knowing how many animals died 
from the spill, especially during the initial impact.  Its predictions 
were estimates. 
Moreover, there was (and is) no indication in the Summary of 
Injury that any long-term effects were anticipated, though they 
were regarded as a possibility.  With the benefit of hindsight, a Na-
tional Research Council study determined in 2003: 
One of the more profound outcomes of the 1989 Exxon Valdez 
oil spill was the recognition of our limited ability to realistically 
predict the effects of an oil spill on marine resources.  The ongo-
ing debate over long-term damages further highlights just how 
inadequate previous knowledge was in attempting to discern 
cause and effect in natural environments.  This lack of knowl-
edge was, on one level, an incomplete understanding of what re-
sources were present.  But even more fundamental was a lack of 
understanding of the structure and functioning of complex eco-
systems.104 
The 1991 settlement was thus approved despite a measure of 
ignorance.  The unexpected soon would be revealed and reflect 
dire circumstances.  The Reopener, a clause the governments did 
not expect to invoke,105 now offers an opportunity to hold Exxon 
accountable for the extent of the damage it caused. 
C. A Reconstituted and Better-Directed Council 
It is trivial, perhaps, to suggest that a different Trustee Council 
might have gone in another direction.  But it might be useful to ex-
 
 103.  Id. at 14,694. 
 104. COMM. TO REVIEW THE OIL SPILL RECOVERY, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 51 (2003). 
 105. See 1991 Gov’t Consent Decree Mem., supra note 10, at 28. 
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plore what potentially is a highly creative force for restoration of 
long-term environmental damage.  Can natural resource trustees 
fulfill the potential for which they are acclaimed? 
1. Theoretical and Practical Problems with Any Council: 
Who, What, and How?  As representatives of myriad competing 
interests, it is not surprising that NRD trustees have been accused 
of inefficiency, ineptitude, and self-dealing.  Allegations against the 
EVOS Trustee Council include: inefficient use of recovered funds, 
abuse of settlement authority for the benefit of Potentially Respon-
sible Parties (“PRPs”), preclusion of private claims, open conflicts 
where trustees are PRPs, and problems inherent in concurrent trus-
tee jurisdiction.106 
First, NRD trustees may be taken to task for spending too 
much money on administrative costs and not enough on restora-
tion, rehabilitation, and acquisition of the equivalent of damaged 
resources.107  The EVOS Trustee Council has gone astray in a simi-
lar manner, diverting $4.5 million in settlement funds to “restore 
and protect waterways across the U.S.”108  These funds were used to 
plant forest buffers along waterways in Chesapeake Bay—an admi-
rable endeavor, to be sure, but completely unrelated to the restora-
tion of Prince William Sound.  The Trustee Council also acquired 
land in and around Prince William Sound at a cost one-and-one-
half times the appraised value.109 
 
 106. See, e.g., Kevin R. Murray et al., Natural Resource Damage Trustees: 
Whose Side Are They Really On?, 5 ENVTL. LAW. 407 (1999); Laura Rowley, NRD 
Trustees: To What Extent Are They Truly Trustees?, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 
459 (2001); Rhoda L. White, Comment, Natural Resource Damages: Trusting the 
Trustees, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 407 (1990). 
 107. For example, in 1995 the Cantara Trustee Council, formed to oversee 
funds recovered from a train derailment that spilled 19,000 gallons of herbicide 
into the Sacramento River, announced it would spend the $14 million in recovery 
damages on a variety of projects not affecting the river.  See GAO, REP. NO. B-
270985, SUPERFUND: OUTLOOK FOR AND EXPERIENCE WITH NATURAL 
RESOURCE DAMAGE SETTLEMENTS 24 (1996). 
 108. Press Release, EPA, Browner Announces Availability of Exxon Valdez 
Funds for Chesapeake Bay Watershed Protection Projects (Mar. 19, 1997), 
http://www..epa.gov/newsroom/newsreleases.htm. 
 109. Through 1997, the trustees acquired nine parcels at a cost of $234 million, 
with an appraised value of only $150 million.  GAO, REP. NO. B-280449, STATUS 
OF PAYMENTS AND USE OF EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL SETTLEMENT FUNDS 14 
(1998).  Three of the parcels were subject to ANCSA, offering a degree of protec-
tion from development and some restrictions on the land’s use.  Department of the 
Interior officials believed those protections and restrictions were difficult to act 
upon.  Id. at 18.  The solution was to re-purchase the land. 
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A second criticism of the NRD trustee system is that trustees, 
as government actors, face a conflict of interest when seeking a set-
tlement with a PRP that makes significant contributions to a state’s 
economy. There can be little doubt that the federal and state gov-
ernments took into account Exxon’s importance to the American 
and Alaskan economies in reaching a settlement.  Every tremulous 
step of the process shows a disposition to avoid offense to oil.  Si-
lence on the Reopener thus seems predictable. 
Third, government trustees may try to protect their exclusive 
authority to assert NRD claims.110  The Exxon Valdez litigation 
confirms the federal and state governments’ monopoly in this re-
gard.111 
Fourth, in some instances the federal or state government will 
be simultaneously a PRP and a trustee, such as where the federal 
government is responsible under CERCLA for cleaning up military 
facilities.  The Exxon Valdez spill produced a similar conflict for 
the State of Alaska, which faced potential liability from thousands 
of fishermen, property owners, and Alaska Natives.112 
Finally, the statutory scheme establishing multiple NRD trus-
tees has built-in coordination and cooperation difficulties.113  The 
EVOS Trustee Council, comprised of three state and three federal 
nominees, labors under a unanimity requirement for all Trustee 
Council actions.114 
The Council also faces a practical problem related to the defi-
nition of natural resources, which “includes the ‘services’ provided 
by the natural resources on which the villages and local . . . 
econom[ies] depend.”115  In 1989, the National Wildlife Federation 
(“NWF”) conducted a series of public hearings with Alaska resi-
 
 110. Compare Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(5) (2000) (authority to 
recover damages held by a trustee selected by the government) with Oil Pollution 
Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(C) (2000) (damages recoverable by any claim-
ant injured by the loss of natural resources). 
 111. See Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon, 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(res judicata prevents private parties from recovering where a public trustee has 
already recovered for the same injury). 
 112. See, e.g., Eyak Native Vill. v. Exxon, 25 F.3d 773, 778 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 113. See Trustees for Natural Resources, 40 C.F.R. § 300.615(a) (2004) (antici-
pating need for cooperation among multiple trustees). 
 114. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, General Operating Procedures pt. 
II-1 (July 9, 2002), http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/pdf/admin/progeneralop.pdf. 
 115. SALLY K. FAIRFAX & DARLA GUENZLER, CONSERVATION TRUSTS 74 
(2001). 
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dents.116  The compilers noted many aspects of Alaskan life that 
could not be simply measured or restored by the trustees, despite 
their best efforts to repair the ecosystem and replenish natural re-
sources.  The hearings testimony disclosed increased drug and al-
cohol abuse, a rise in child neglect and abuse, overloaded mental 
health facilities, and increased suicide rates.117  Communities were 
divided between long-term residents and those who came to Alaska 
in search of high-paying clean-up jobs.  Businesses lost employees 
who abandoned their longtime positions to profit from the clean-up 
effort.  With the increase in people came an increase in crime, 
waste, and traffic.118  In short, any attempt the EVOS trustees made 
to restore natural resources could not alleviate the economic, envi-
ronmental—even psychological—suffering of local communities 
directly related to the spill.119 
2. Performance of the EVOS Trustee Council. 
a. The Slow Start: “They Paid Themselves.”  Between 
1989 and 1991, the Trustee Council published three versions of its 
assessment plan to identify the damages caused by the Exxon Val-
dez spill.120  The plans were prepared pursuant to CERCLA regula-
tions acknowledging the government’s standing to sue for NRD 
recovery.  CERCLA also requires the Department of the Interior 
to develop procedures for assessing NRD.121  Consequently, the 
Department published regulations for simple “Type A” assess-
ments and more complex “Type B” assessments.122  In providing for 
two procedures, Congress “envisioned generally that Type A rules 
would cover most minor releases and Type B rules would cover 
large or unusually damaging releases.”123  Based on the magnitude 
 
 116. The Day the Water Died: A Compilation of the November 1989 Citizens 
Commission Hearings on the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (1990) (sponsored and pub-
lished by the NWF in cooperation with Natural Resources Defense Council 
(“NRDC”), the Wildlife Federation of Alaska, and the Windstar Foundation). 
 117. Id. at 37. 
 118. Id. 
 119. The Native populations, dependent on ecosystems damaged by the Exxon 
Valdez spill, suffered psychological and cultural harm to their subsistence way of 
life.  For Natives, simple clean-up efforts could not compensate for the intangible 
losses suffered “the day the water died.”  Id. at 44–45. 
 120. See Christine Cartwright, Comment, Natural Damage Assessment: The 
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill and Its Implications, 17 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 
451, 461–62 (1991). 
 121. 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c) (2000). 
 122. Cartwright, supra note 120, at 466. 
 123. Colorado v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 880 F.2d 481, 487 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
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of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the Trustee Council was clearly cor-
rect in adopting a Type B assessment methodology.124 
The first assessment plan, published in 1989, proposed nine 
studies to quantify the economic value of the damaged resources.125  
Only one study examined the market value of lost services to hu-
mans.126  Around this time, the D.C. Circuit Court in Ohio v. De-
partment of the Interior127 reviewed Type B regulations, holding that 
“market prices are not acceptable as primary measures of the use 
values of natural resources.”128  The next plan, proposed in 1990, 
reflected Ohio’s influence: the Council sought to evaluate the in-
trinsic value of natural resources impacted by the Exxon spill.129  In 
revising the studies, the Council included measures to assess the 
cost of restoring, replacing, or acquiring the equivalent of the dam-
aged resources.130  The 1991 plan reiterated the methods of the 1990 
studies and looked at increases in the market price of petroleum on 
consumers.  Building on Ohio, this plan better approximated the 
total NRD value caused by the spill.131  The 1991 plan estimated 
damages in excess of $3 billion, a shocking figure that likely facili-
tated settlement—for one-third of that amount.132 
Through 1992, Exxon paid two annual installments (for a total 
of $240 million) of the $900 million owed under the civil settle-
ment.133  Of this, $107 million was returned to federal and state 
agencies as reimbursement for pre-settlement clean-up and damage 
assessment costs.134  An additional $40 million was offset against 
 
 124. Cartwright, supra note 120, at 469–70. 
 125. The proposed studies included: (1) effects on commercial fishery prices; 
(2) changes in fishing industry costs; (3) use value of commercial fisheries; (4) ef-
fect on value of public land; (5) economic injuries to recreational users of natural 
resources; (6) value of impact to resources relied on by subsistence users; (7) loss 
of intrinsic value of resources; (8) economic damage to research programs; and (9) 
economic damage to archaeological sites.  Id. at 479–81. 
 126. Deborah S. Bardwick, The American Tort System’s Response to Environ-
mental Disaster, 19 STAN. ENVTL L.J. 259, 270 (2000). 
 127. 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 128. Id. at 463. 
 129. Bardwick, supra note 126, at 271 (specifically, the plan included contingent 
valuation of recreational activities and intrinsic values of lost subsistence uses and 
uses of archaeological sites). 
 130. Cartwright, supra note 120, at 483. 
 131. Id. at 488. 
 132. See John Lancaster, Value of Intangible Losses from Exxon Valdez Spill 
Put at $3 Billion, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 1991, at A4. 
 133. GAO, REP. NO. B-254199, supra note 92, at 5. 
 134. Id. 
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Exxon’s payments for clean-up costs incurred in 1991.135  Sadly, this 
reimbursement paid for a poorly managed effort:136 workers looted 
archaeological sites,137 beaches were gravely damaged by hot water 
scouring,138 and dispersants further contaminated the beaches.139  
Even the General Accounting Office (“GAO”) saw room for im-
provement, recommending that federal and state trustees work 
proactively and cooperatively to spend the billion dollars more ef-
fectively.140 
Use of the civil settlement funds, less the reimbursements, has 
been charted by Patty Brown-Schwalenberg, executive director of 
the Chugach Regional Resources Commission as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 135. Id. at 3. 
 136. See SHARON E. MCCLINTOCK, OILED COMMUNITIES RESPONSE 
INVESTIGATION REPORT, in 1990 OIL SPILL REPORT, supra note 2, at 36 (“The ef-
fort to clean the oil was viewed as ridiculous.  Every time workers would attempt 
to [clean] the beaches, for example, groups, regulatory agencies or someone in a 
monkey suit would arrive and say, ‘You’re killing seaweed.’ or ‘Stop, there might 
be salmon in the stream.’” . . . “Exxon hired the crews for one day to pretend to 
clean the beaches at Gore Point, but as soon as CBS News left, the crews were 
demobilized. . . . Gore Point remained mired in oil.”) 
 137. IMPACT ASSESSMENT, INC., EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL, CLEANUP, AND 
LITIGATION: A COLLECTION OF SOCIAL-IMPACTS INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS 73–
74 (2001), available at http://www.mms.gov/alaska/reports/2003andOlderRpts/ 
EVOS/volume5.pdf. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. GAO, REP. NO. B-254199, supra note 92, at 6–7 (recommending “[a]mong 
other things, [that] attention should be given to (1) completing restoration and 
land acquisition plans, (2) requiring more timely and better quality project reports, 
(3) providing for more open competition for restoration projects, and (4) improv-
ing internal controls.”). 
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Figure 3.  Total EVOS ExpensesWithoutReimbursements. Courtesy of 
Patty Brown-Schwalenberg.141 
b. Mid-Course Correction: The Tanker Blockade.  It is 
tempting to conclude the EVOS Trustee Council’s “eureka mo-
ment” occurred when Alaska’s salmon fishing fleet blockaded 
tanker access to Valdez in the fall of 1993.142  An August 1993 GAO 
report had criticized the Council’s procedures and outlays.143  This 
 
 141. Patty Brown-Schwalenberg, The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: Impacts and Re-
sponse from a Tribal Perspective 14 (Chugach Regional Resources Comm’n, Jan. 
2004) (draft paper for presentation, on file with author). 
 142. JOHN KEEBLE, OUT OF THE CHANNEL: THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL IN 
PRINCE WILLIAM SOUND 323–25 (1999). 
 143. GAO, REP. NO. B-254199, supra note 92, at 3.  Of the $240 million paid by 
Exxon through 1992, by February 1993 only $19 million had been spent on damage 
assessment, restoration, and administrative costs.  Of this, only $5.7 million went 
towards restoration—this was approximately 2.4% of the amount paid by Exxon 
to that point.  Of the remaining $240 million, $107 million reimbursed federal and 
state agencies and $40 million reimbursed Exxon for response costs, and $74 mil-
lion remained in trust for future work.  Id. 
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was not news to local fishers, who were painfully aware of the lack 
of progress on restoration and quite familiar with the shell-game 
features of Council expenditures.144  Knowing that Secretary of the 
Interior Bruce Babbitt was in Alaska, and that Exxon’s ship Sea 
River Baton Rouge was due to enter the port of Valdez on August 
19, a fishing fleet set up a blockade across the inlet, intending to 
escort the ship to the terminal.145  The fishers hoped to raise aware-
ness of their condition, but with advance knowledge of the block-
ade, Exxon delayed the ship’s approach.146  Other tankers also de-
layed entry, not wanting to take the heat intended for Exxon.147  For 
possibly the first time since the opening of the Trans-Alaska pipe-
line, there were no tankers within Prince William Sound.148  Sympa-
thy was definitely in the fishers’ favor—Governor Walter Hickel 
declared, “[i]f I were a fisherman, I’d probably be out there too.”149  
Three days after the blockade began, Secretary Babbitt flew to 
Valdez to meet with the fishers.  He convinced them to end the 
blockade in exchange for a promise to investigate their complaints 
against the Council.150  The Council was responsive and began to 
finalize agreements for purchase of land and conservation ease-
ments on important forest habitat.151 
The Council also commenced a monitoring and research pro-
gram that has grown in scope and intensity over time.152  Council 
reports claim to have invested approximately $170 million on 
“hundreds of research, monitoring, and general restoration pro-
jects,”153 to investigate the spill’s impact on a wide variety of spe-
cies, recreation, archaeological resources, and subsistence uses.154 
The EVOS Council also has encouraged large-scale ecosystem 
studies, funding three long-term projects to assess ecosystem 
health.  The Sound Ecosystem Assessment (“SEA”) project is the 
most ambitious, focusing on the spill’s impact on herring and pink 
salmon fisheries, and funded at $22.4 million over a seven-year pe-
 
 144. KEEBLE, supra note 142, at 323–24. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 324–25. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. EVOS Trustee Council, Restoration Project Highlights, http://www.evostc. 
state.ak.us/restoration/ highlights.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2005). 
 154. For a list of project final reports, see http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/ restora-
tion/projects.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2005). 
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riod.155  The Council also funded the Alaska Predator Ecosystem 
Experiment (“APEX”), a five-year, $10.8 million project begun in 
1996.156  APEX investigated the general hypothesis that low food 
abundance contributed to the decline of seabird and marine mam-
mal populations in Prince William Sound.157 
Finally, in order to study the continuing impact of oil on 
mammal and bird species, in March 1995 the trustees approved a 
$6.5 million Nearshore Vertebrate Program (“NVP”) to be con-
ducted over a period of five years.158  The NVP project focused on 
four species, two that feed on fish (river otters and pigeon guille-
mots) and two that feed on shellfish (sea otters and harlequin 
ducks).159  Despite its efforts, the Council could only study a frac-
tion of the 128 species killed in the Exxon Valdez spill; there was 
no follow-up research on marine invertebrates.160   
Additionally, the Council’s most conspicuous “restoration” 
was the acquisition of a number of Native corporation properties 
that were slated for clear-cutting.161  Although the impetus for this 
action mostly came from environmentalists, the Native entities 
benefited from less-than-fee transfers.162  However, strong and co-
gent objection was raised as to whether a twentieth-century envi-
ronmental catastrophe should serve to divest Natives of their prop-
erties as efficiently as the much-maligned nineteenth-century In-
dian General Allotment Act.163 
 
 155. EVOS Trustee Council, Ecosystem Based Research, http://www.evostc. 
state.ak.us/restoration/ecosystem.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2005). 
 156. OTT, supra note 3, at 319. 
 157. See Alaska Predator Ecosystem Experiment, http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/oil/ 
apex.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2005). 
 158. EVOS TRUSTEE COUNCIL, MECHANISMS OF IMPACT AND POTENTIAL 
RECOVERY OF NEARSHORE VERTEBRATE PREDATORS FOLLOWING THE 1989 
EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL, FINAL REPORT 1 (2002), available at 
http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/pdf/final_reports/025chapters01.pdf. 
 159. Id. at 1.6–1.8. 
 160. KEEBLE, supra note 142, at 140–41. 
 161. See Lankard, supra note 61, at 375–76 (discussing the forced transfer of 
Native land rights to the government in exchange for an environmental restoration 
program funded by Exxon damages). 
 162. An especially effective voice has been Mr. Rick Steiner, Director of the 
Coastal Coalition, who has inundated authorities with a well-reasoned stream of 
correspondence.  Steiner suggests that $30 million of the Reopener could be used 
to buy back and shut down the commercial herring fishery, causing a rebound in 
herring stocks that would benefit the entire ecosystem.  See Joel Gay, Herring 
Buyback Urged, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 31, 2002, at B1. 
 163. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, Pub. L. 108-498, 24 Stat. 388, 388–91 (1887) 
(providing for the allotment of lands in severalty to Indians on the various reserva-
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c. Natives Left Out Again.  The EVOS Trustee Council, 
made up exclusively of state and federal employees, was less than 
extravagant in the allotment of funds towards the restoration of 
Native resources, even though Native villages were in the middle of 
the spill area164 and the disaster interfered dramatically with subsis-
tence harvests.165  Alaska Natives seemed an afterthought to the 
Council—five years passed before Council personnel became in-
volved with Native communities in the spill area.166 
In 1994, the Council made its initial foray into the realm of 
Traditional Ecological Knowledge (“TEK”) when the Council de-
veloped a handbook illustrating how its biologists could integrate 
TEK into data collection.167  They also interviewed community 
members to document historical distribution patterns of various 
species.168  Between 1995 and 2001, the Council engaged facilitators 
(typically tribal government employees) from ten affected commu-
nities to increase communication between the Council and com-
munity members.169  Just over $6 million from the settlement with 
Exxon was appropriated to the Alaska Department of Community 
and Economic Development (“DCED”) in order to implement a 
grant program, “with the purpose of restoring, replacing, or en-
hancing subsistence resources or other services damaged or lost as 
a result of the Exxon Valdez oil spill.”170  The grants went to the 
nine non-incorporated communities of Tatitlek, Chenega Bay, Port 
 
tions and extending the protection of U.S. law over the Indians).  For this piece of 
regrettable history, see D.W.C. Duncan, How Allotment Impoverishes the Indians: 
Testimony Before a Senate Comm. Investigating Conditions in the Indian Territory 
(1906), reprinted in GREAT DOCUMENTS IN AMERICAN INDIAN HISTORY 286 (W. 
Moquin & C. Van Doren eds., 1995). 
 164. Varanasi, supra note 40. 
 165. See 1990 OIL SPILL REPORT, supra note 2, at 73 (graphic on “Annual 
Round of Subsistence Resource Utilization in Port Graham and English Bay, 
1981–1982”).  The villages at Chignik Lake, Karluk, Nanwalek, Ouzinkie and Tati-
tlek are among the eight highest consumers of salmon in Alaska.  See also Robert 
Duff, Director, Wash. Office of Envt’l Health Assessments, Persistent Problem: 
Widespread Chemical Contamination of Fish, Presentation at the Univ. of Or. 
Envt’l Law Conference (Mar. 2005); cf. Robert J. Wolfer, Local Traditions and 
Subsistence: A Synopsis from Twenty-Five Years of Research by the State of 
Alaska, Dep’t of Fish & Game, TECH. PAPER NO. 284 (2004). 
 166. See EVOS TRUSTEE COUNCIL, EVOS TRIBAL AND COMMUNITY 
INVOLVEMENT 2 (2002), available at http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/pdf/ 
comminvrpt.pdf. 
 167. Id. at 4. 
 168. Id. at 3. 
 169. Id. at 1–2. 
 170. Id. at 4. 
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Graham, Nanwalek, Karluk, Chignik Lake, Chignik Lagoon, Per-
ryville, and Ivanof Bay.171  The three Alaska state representatives 
on the Trustee Council are responsible for determining whether 
grants are awarded.172  As of 2002, twenty-four projects had been 
funded with these grants.173 
The crucial subsistence issue of oiled food was addressed di-
rectly not by the EVOS Trustee Council but by the Society of En-
vironmental Toxicology and Chemistry (“SETAC”).174  Exxon also 
played a role: in July 1989, Exxon and NOAA entered into a 
Memorandum of Understanding related to the “Sampling and 
Analysis of Subsistence Food Resources.”175  This crucial informa-
tion on food warnings for subsistence users fell victim to the gen-
eral embargo on litigation-sensitive studies and was not released, 
even in preliminary form, until March 1991.176  Public review was 
pushed back to 1993.177 
Exxon Command decided to form its own team, including a 
medical doctor and an industrial hygienist, to hold a series of 
meetings in all the spill-area villages and with Native organiza-
tions about subsistence food impacts, toxicity of oil to residents, 
and health threats to clean-up workers.  These meetings were 
two months before the [Oil Spill Health Task Force] sponsored 
community meetings would begin.  Exxon proceeded to arrange 
with . . . [Native organizations] to hold a series of village meet-
ings.  Exxon also wanted to present the early risk-assessment re-
sults from the [Food and Drug Administration] and the sensory 
test results from the [Alaska Department of Environmental 
Conservation] laboratory in Palmer.  However, the downside of 
this initiative by Exxon was that these Exxon-sponsored meetings 
undermined the OSHTF’s attempts to serve as a unified commu-
nication team while fueling the villagers’ suspicions that they were 
being manipulated by competing parties.178 
The independent experts evaluating the impact of the spill on 
subsistence food resources reported on the “Crisis, Confusion, and 
 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See generally SOC’Y OF ENVT’L TOXICOLOGY AND CHEMISTRY, 
EVALUATING AND COMMUNICATING SUBSISTENCE SEAFOOD SAFETY IN A CROSS-
CULTURAL CONTEXT: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL 
(1999). 
 175. Id. at 317; see also id. at 243 (“Exxon made subsistence food safety a prior-
ity and designed a sampling program to be conducted in all spill areas (except the 
Alaska peninsula) over a period of weeks.”). 
 176. Id. at 246. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 243–44 (emphasis added). 
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Uncertainty Among Alaska Native Communities in the Oil Spill 
Area.”179  They found a lack of leadership due to the fact that there 
was no agency or organization with a “clear mandate” to address 
subsistence food safety concerns.180  They also highlighted the reac-
tions of Natives to this “void of responsibility” that initially re-
sulted in the perception by many in the Native community that no 
one took their concerns seriously.181  Natives were convinced that 
politics stood behind the infamous “double standard,” a zero-
tolerance policy for commercial fisheries if oil was present in quan-
tities sufficient to foul gear, but any food for subsistence fisheries 
was “likely safe to eat” if it had no smell, taste, or appearance of 
oil.182 
d. The Current Course: Reopener or Not?  Over time, 
the EVOS Trustee Council achieved a modicum of independence 
from its political sponsors.  It developed a classification scheme for 
expressing progress towards the goal of complete restoration.183  It 
tracked thirty species and resources, characterizing them as “Not 
Recovering,” “Recovering,” “Recovered,” or “Recovery Un-
known.”184  There has been no extended discussion of whether un-
monitored conditions and species are “fully recovered,” as no in-
formation is available.   
The Council’s most recent evaluation of the “Status of Injured 
Resources” is as follows: 
 
 
 
 179. Id. at 237. 
 180. Id. at 239. 
 181. Id. at 239–42. 
 182. Id. at 247. 
 183. EVOS Trustee Council, Status of Injured Resources, http://www.evostc. 
state.ak.us/facts/status.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2005).  Apparently, the Status of 
Injured Resources has not been updated since 2002—the same data is used in the 
most recent EVOS Status Report.  See EVOS TRUSTEE COUNCIL, UPDATE ON 
INJURED RESOURCES AND SERVICES (2002), available at http://www.evostc.state. 
ak.us/pdf/restoration/injupdate02.pdf. 
 184. Id. 
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Recovered Recovering Not Recovered 
Recovery 
Unknown 
Archaeological 
resources Clams Common loon 
Cutthroat 
trout 
Pink salmon Marbled murrelet 
Harlequin 
duck Dolly varden 
River otter Mussels Cormorants (3 species) 
Kittlitz’s 
murrelet 
Sockeye 
salmon 
Wilderness 
areas Pacific herring Rockfish 
Bald eagle Sea otter Harbor seal Subtidal communities 
Black 
oystercatcher 
Fish-eating 
killer whale 
pod AB 
Pigeon 
Guillemot  
Common mure Sediments   
 Table 1:  Status of Injured Resources.185 
 
A “recovered” species is one that has returned to pre-spill 
conditions186 or meets recovery objectives.187  “Recovering” means 
“substantive progress is being made toward recovery objectives,”188 
with the timeline varying by resource.189  Resources that are “not 
recovered” are those demonstrating “little or no clear improve-
ment since spill injuries occurred.”190  If labeled “recovery un-
known,” limited data is available for that resource.191 
 
 185. Id. 
 186. RESTORATION PLAN, supra note 7, at 35–37.  Defining the “baseline” for 
restoration is the single most important issue in valuing NRD. 
 187. UPDATE ON INJURED RESOURCES AND SERVICES, supra note 183, at 2–3. 
 188. RESTORATION PLAN, supra note 7, at 35–37. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
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In addition to the tracked resources, the EVOS Trustee Coun-
cil recognizes that certain human services were impaired by the 
spill, such as recreation and tourism, commercial fishing, subsis-
tence, and passive use.192  The Council considers these services “re-
covering until the resources on which they depend are fully recov-
ered.”193 
Certain Council staffers have written on the status of recovery 
and the pursuit of the Reopener.  For example, in 2003, Chief Sci-
entist Phil Mundy advised the Council that Prince William Sound 
was an “impaired water body” under EPA criteria and suggested 
that conditions for triggering the Reopener were clearly met.194 
The Clean Water Act requires states to compile lists of im-
paired water bodies and then develop and implement total maxi-
mum daily loads (“TMDLs”) for these waters.195  TMDLs specify 
the maximum amount of a pollutant that a water body can sustain 
and still meet water quality standards.196  In Alaska’s 2002-2003 In-
tegrated Water Quality Monitoring and Assessment Report (re-
quired by the Clean Water Act), Prince William Sound is listed as 
“impaired but not needing a TMDL.”197  The offered justification is 
that a TMDL process would duplicate efforts of the EVOS Trustee 
Council and restoration projects specified in the Exxon Valdez 
Restoration Plan.198 
Water quality standards are developed based on the uses for 
which a water body is allocated.  In Alaska, marine water uses in-
clude aquaculture, seafood processing, recreation, growth and 
propagation of fish and other wildlife, and harvesting of raw 
 
 192. Id. at 31–32; see also UPDATE ON INJURED RESOURCES AND SERVICES, su-
pra note 183, at 23–28. 
 193. RESTORATION PLAN, supra note 7, at 31–32. 
 194. E-mail from Phil Mundy, Chief Scientist, Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee 
Council, to Jeep Rice & Molly McCammon (May 29, 2003) [hereinafter Mundy 
Email] (on file with author).  An “impaired water body” is one that has not at-
tained and maintained water quality standards even after point sources of pollu-
tion have installed the required levels of pollution control technologies.  See 40 
C.F.R. §§ 130.2(j), 131.3(h) (2004). 
 195. See 40 C.F.R. § 130.7 (2004). 
 196. Id. § 132.2.  For an introduction to TMDL regulations, see Oliver A. 
Houck, TMDLs: The Resurrection of Water Quality Standards-Based Regulation 
Under the Clean Water Act, 27 E.L.R. 10329 (1997). 
 197. ALASKA DEP’T OF ENVT’L CONSERVATION, FINAL INTEGRATED WATER 
QUALITY MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT REPORT 49 (2003), available at 
http://www.dec.state.ak.us/water/wqsar/pdfs/finali%20integrated%202002-2003 
%20report.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2005) [hereinafter WATER QUALITY REPORT]. 
 198. Id. 
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aquatic life.199  In order to meet water quality standards, Prince Wil-
liam Sound would have to be free of concentrations of petroleum 
hydrocarbons in shoreline or bottom sediments that cause deleteri-
ous effects to aquatic life; surface waters and adjoining shore-lines 
would have to be virtually free from floating oil, film, sheen, or dis-
coloration; surface water could not exceed concentrations that in-
dividually or in combination impart odor or taste as determined by 
organoleptic tests; and raw aquatic life organisms could not exceed 
concentrations that impart undesirable odor or taste as determined 
by bioassay or organoleptic tests.200  Prince William Sound can be 
considered impaired because the presence of petroleum hydrocar-
bons, oil, and grease is not low enough to satisfy the standards 
linked to those uses.201 
Sixteen years after the spill, Prince William Sound may still be 
considered impaired because of the presence of Exxon’s petroleum 
hydrocarbons, oil, and grease.  The State of Alaska justifies avoid-
ance of expensive TMDL analysis and implementation by referring 
to the Trustee Council’s “pollution control requirements.”202  But 
habitat monitoring and assessment—what the EVOS Trustee 
Council does—are not “pollution control requirements.”  Rather, 
the Council’s strategy relies on natural recovery.203  Who will tell 
the TMDL planners that the State is prepared to leave $100 million 
on the table because it does not know what to do with it? 
In 2003, the Trustee Council’s Executive Director, Molly 
McCammon, hinted that there were sufficient grounds for invoking 
the Reopener.  In a memo to the Council, McCammon discussed 
additional oil-spill-related injuries to natural resources that have 
been discovered since the 1991 settlement.204  McCammon noted 
that for some species, “and for the ecosystem itself,” the Council 
could not know if full recovery had occurred.205  Thus, the Council 
implemented the Gulf Ecosystem Monitoring Program in 1999, as a 
 
 199. See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, § 70.020 (2005). 
 200. Id. 
 201. 40 C.F.R. §§ 130.2(j), 131.3(i) (2004); see also Mundy Email, supra note 
194. 
 202. WATER QUALITY REPORT, supra note 196, at 5, 10, 20, 71. 
 203. EVOS Trustee Council, Restoration Project Highlights, supra note 153 
(noting that “in most cases, if protected from harm, injured species will recover on 
their own”). 
 204. Memorandum from Molly McCammon, Executive Director, EVOS Trus-
tee Council, to U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Alaska Att’y Gen., and Trustee Council 
Members 7–9 (June 12, 2003) (on file with author). 
 205. Id. at 5. 
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“means of ensuring and enhancing restoration and recovery well 
into the future.”206 
From the beginning, the State of Alaska and the United States 
did not support the idea of invoking the Reopener clause.207  None-
theless, they seem to understand that a decision to forego the Re-
opener would attract intense public scrutiny.208  The EVOS Trustee 
Council has hired a consultant to help with these matters, but this 
has produced its own stumbles.  Integral Consulting has been con-
tracted to conduct “a series of evaluations using available scientific 
data to provide an independent analysis of [the] recovery status of 
key resources and to define any linkage to residual oil.”209  The 
work includes “a re-survey of sediment quality . . . to assess in situ 
levels of toxicity in areas most likely to remain oil-impaired,” and a 
“synthesis of scientific information relevant to injury from lingering 
oil . . . [that] will provide information on the status of injured re-
sources and options for future restoration.”210 
According to Integral’s website, the firm has developed a 
“conceptual exposure model” (“CEM”) to provide a “pictorial rep-
resentation of the relationship between oil and injured resources,” 
and a framework for assessing resources currently listed as Recov-
ering or Not Recovered.211 
 
 206. Id.  McCammon also noted, in the “best judgment of the scientists most 
closely familiar with oil spill injury,” there were species and resources whose inju-
ries were likely related to the oil spill but it was difficult to prove a cause-effect 
linkage; there were also species whose injury was strongly linked to the spill.  Id. at 
7–9 (“Probable injury unknown at time of settlement, with stronger linkage to oil 
spill [includes]: injury to subsistence uses . . . pink salmon had more damage than 
expected . . . oil remaining in the environment in a toxic state for a longer period 
of time than originally expected . . . mussel beds data in 1999 indicate that oil is 
still being accumulated in mussels and several other invertebrate prey spe-
cies. . . .”). 
 207. 1991 Gov’t Consent Decree Mem., supra note 10, at 28 (“[b]ased on the 
results of the damage assessment, the Governments do not believe that they will 
ever need to invoke [the Reopener] clause”). 
 208. Compare Craig R. O’Connor, Natural Res. Special Counsel, NOAA Of-
fice of Gen. Counsel, Interview with NRD Seminar, Univ. of Wash. Sch. of Law 
(Feb. 3, 2005) (on file with author); with Jim Carlton, Groups Seek to Add $100 
Million to Bill for Exxon Oil Spill, WALL ST. J., Aug. 30, 2001, at B4. 
 209. Integral Consulting: News, http://www.integral-corp.com/page.php?pname 
=news/article&article_id=42 (last visited Oct. 2, 2005). 
 210. EVOS TRUSTEE COUNCIL, WORKPLAN FY 2004–FY 2006 26 (2004), 
http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/pdf/Work%20Plans/Final_2004_Workplan.pdf. 
 211. Integral Consulting: News, supra note 209. 
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However, the contract with Integral has raised concerns about 
conflicts of interests for the Council.212  Ernesta Ballard, Commis-
sioner of the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation 
until October 2004, initially recommended Integral.213  In February 
2005 she admitted to having worked with Integral on a project for 
Ketchikan Pulp Company before she joined state government.214  
The impartiality of Integral is also questionable when it comes to 
developing projects financed by Reopener funds—Integral’s web-
site notes that its scientists are trained technically and policy-wise 
to assist PRPs in addressing NRD claims.215  In other words, the 
Trustee Council has hired a PRP consultant for its Reopener ad-
vice.  We recommend, instead, that questions about ongoing resto-
ration be referred to a committee of the National Research Coun-
cil.  We are confident that this is the best way to get unbiased ad-
vice at a reasonable cost. 
Apparently, the Council itself is unsure if Integral’s work will 
completely answer all questions.216  The Council issued a Request 
for Proposals (“RFP”) on February 15, 2005, to study possible 
remediation projects to address the problem of lingering oil in 
sediments.217  The Council’s language is instructive: 
 
 212. GAO, REP. NO. B-280449, supra note 109, at 5–6 (“The same agencies—
and sometimes the same individuals—that recommend a project for funding also 
approve and carry out the project.”). 
 213. Tom Kizzia, 16 Years Later, Pressure Mounts To Settle Spill Suit–Exxon 
Valdez: State, Federal Lawyers Must Decide By Next Summer Whether to Seek 
Additional Damages, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Feb. 27, 2005, at A1. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Integral Consulting: NRD Assessment, http://www.integral-corp.com/page. 
php?pname=projects/damage (last visited Oct. 2, 2005). 
 216. Three major initial findings resulted from Integral’s review and synthesis: 
(1) lingering oil most significant in intertidal areas; (2) surface Exxon Valdez oil 
(the focus of evaluation efforts following the oil spill) has a patchy distribution 
pattern and persists predominantly in a weathered form that is not bio-available; 
and (3) subsurface Exxon Valdez oil has experienced more limited weathering and 
degradation, is sequestered in armored beaches and sheltered shorelines, and has 
greater bioavailability.  Most resources currently classified as injured have limited 
or no exposure to lingering oil.  Integral Consulting: News, supra note 209. 
 217. EVOS TRUSTEE COUNCIL, RFP: IDENTIFY AND EVALUATE OIL 
REMEDIATION TECHNOLOGIES APPLICABLE TO LINGERING OIL IN PRINCE 
WILLIAM SOUND, ALASKA 4 (2005), available at http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/ 
pdf/05LingeringOil_RFP.pdf.  The Council noted, based on NOAA findings, 
“approximately 28 acres (approximately 56 tons) of lingering oil is estimated to 
persist in intertidal sediments of beaches in PWS.  Although this is a small fraction 
of the total area oiled in 1989, it nevertheless remains a potential concern for 
ongoing exposure to resources that have not recovered from injury caused by the 
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Given the recent findings on lingering oil, it is an appropriate 
time to identify potential options for further clean up, evaluate 
them for effectiveness, economic cost, environmental benefits 
and environmental impacts.  The fundamental question: Is there 
is [sic] a clean up strategy that can feasibly be implemented for 
the 28 acres of sub-surface oil in Prince William Sound that 
would be better than natural recovery?218 
Proposals were due March 16, 2005, with a final report due in 
January 2006.219  With the problem defined as “28 acres of sub-
surface oil,” sweeping remedies are not likely to come about. 
In February 2005, the EVOS Trustee Council also issued an 
RFP for “the synthesis of information relevant to Pacific herring 
and the determination of the status of this species.”220  The Council 
is seeking to evaluate the recovery of Pacific herring by conducting 
an independent evaluation of the eighteen previously conducted 
monitoring and research projects of Pacific herring populations in 
Prince William Sound.221  Proposals are also due March 16, 2005, 
with a final report due in January 2006.222 
D. The Civil Suits: More “What Ifs” 
In the immediate wake of the spill, the Exxon Corporation 
faced enormous potential NRD liabilities.  The common law was 
anticipated to offer broad protections under the theories of public 
trust, parens patriae, and public nuisance.223  Statutory definitions of 
“natural resources” protected all affected resources.224  Contingency 
valuation, to measure damages, gauged liabilities in the many bil-
 
initial spill. . . .” (citations omitted).  The Council distinguished between ‘regular’ 
lingering oil and EVOS oil, which is “is less susceptible to weathering processes 
and is generally more persistent.”  Id. 
 218. Id. at 5. 
 219. Id.  The due date is only four months prior to the deadline for invoking the 
Reopener, as Exxon must receive ninety days notice of intent to invoke the Re-
opener. 
 220. EVOS TRUSTEE COUNCIL, RFP: EXPERT REVIEW—PACIFIC HERRING 
POPULATIONS IN PRINCE WILLIAM SOUND, ALASKA 4 (2005), available at 
http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/pdf/05Herring_RFP.pdf. 
 221. Id. at 5. 
 222. Id. 
 223. See, e.g., Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 238–39 (1907) (noting 
that a state is entitled to protect against the pollution of its natural resources via 
legislation and involvement of the courts); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 
387, 458 (1892) (noting that laws “have sedulously guarded the public use of navi-
gable waters within their limits against infringement, subjecting it only to such 
regulation by the State, in the interest of the public”). 
 224. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2000). 
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lions of dollars.225  The grim economic reality of “restoring” the eco-
logical treasures of Prince William Sound offered no solace—what 
would it cost to “save” a sea otter or an eagle?  The rehabilitation 
rates were $90,000 and $42,000, respectively.226  At these rates, the 
company was facing astronomical out-of-pocket costs. 
The EVOS settlement was a win for Exxon because of the 
company’s brilliantly conceived and effectively implemented de-
fensive strategy.  The strategy consisted of: (1) takeover and domi-
nation of the clean-up; (2) voluntary payments to most-injured par-
ties; (3) quick settlement of initial NRD claims; and (4) aggressive 
resistance of subsequent NRD claims. 
1. Takeover and Domination of the Cleanup. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The Clean-up. Courtesy of Brad Marten, Esq. 
The Prince William Sound clean-up was a disaster on the 
ground, but a legal success for Exxon.  Exxon, which presented it-
self as having done the best it could throughout the crisis, was able 
to assume a “good citizen” mantle, which would prove enormously 
beneficial over the long haul.227  As a good citizen, Exxon was reim-
 
 225. See, e.g., Parrish, supra note 74, at A1. 
 226. KEEBLE, supra note 142, at 303.  Total costs to Exxon of wildlife restora-
tion and rehabilitation were $41 million, though this represents only the costs of 
rehabilitating directly oiled animals.  Id. 
 227. Parrish, supra note 77, at A1 (quoting U.S. District Judge H. Russel Hol-
land). 
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bursed for cash paid in the NRD settlement, was spared a $125 mil-
lion fine in the criminal case, and won reduction of the punitive 
damages award against it. 
With the help of its lawyers, Exxon passed a substantial share 
of spill-related costs onto its insurers.  After six years of arbitration 
and litigation, Exxon and a consortium of over 100 international 
insurers settled a coverage dispute arising from the spill.228  The set-
tlement totaled $780 million.229  Exxon claimed coverage under 
various sections of its policies, including first-party property recov-
ery for removal of debris, marine liability to repay cargo-owners’ 
losses, and general liability for pollution clean-up costs.230  The set-
tlement provided relief for the expenses incurred in the clean-up—
Exxon claims these expenses exceeded $2.5 billion.231 
The outer limits of “good citizen” cost recovery were reached 
only in the takings challenge Exxon brought against the act of Con-
gress that banished the Exxon Valdez from the waters of Prince 
William Sound.  Congress declared in the 1990 OPA that any tank 
vessel that spilled more than one million gallons of oil into the ma-
rine environment of Prince William Sound after March 22, 1989, 
was to be excluded from the Sound.232  This provision effectively 
banned only the Exxon Valdez, as no other tank vessel had spilled 
more than one million gallons of oil into the marine environment.233  
In ruling on Exxon’s takings claim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals was not impressed with Exxon’s argument that this was the 
first bill of attainder ever directed at an inanimate object.  The 
court held the OPA provision was not an unconstitutional bill of 
attainder because it did not punish Exxon, and that the provision 
did not violate procedural due process because it furthered a ra-
tional legislative purpose.234  The court found it “rational for Con-
gress to use this past disaster as a measure of future performance to 
specifically bar the Exxon Valdez from transporting oil through 
Prince William Sound, an area that Congress has accorded special 
statutory protection.”235 
 
 228. Mitchell F. Dolin, An Overview of the Exxon Valdez Insurance Coverage 
Dispute, 5 INT’L INS. L.R. 313, 313–317 (1997). 
 229. Id. at 317. 
 230. See id. at 313. 
 231. Richard Pyle, Insurers Want Off Spill Hook: Companies Say Exxon’s 
Cleanup a PR Ploy, Balk at Paying, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 2, 1993. 
 232. 33 U.S.C. § 2737 (2000). 
 233. See SeaRiver Mar. Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Mineta, 309 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 
2002). 
 234. Id. at 680. 
 235. Id. 
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2. Exxon Voluntary Payments.  The strategy of making volun-
tary payments to most injured parties was well conceived and quite 
successful.  It soaked up the private claims and undercut the 
broader litigation strategies of private claimants.236  Of course, it 
was not just strategy—Exxon greatly benefited from the federal 
district court’s ruling that plaintiffs must exhaust the $100 million 
Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act Fund (“TAPF”) before 
pursuing their claims.237  TAPF cushioned the initial blow for Exxon 
across a broad spectrum of claimants because the fund did not pay 
out on a first-come, first-served basis, but rather paid proportion-
ately on all accepted claims.238  Claimants therefore had to settle 
with or fight Exxon for the remaining balance.239 
In the first year of litigation, approximately 52,000 plaintiffs 
filed more than 200 suits against Exxon in federal and state court.240  
While many claimants argued amongst themselves whether indi-
vidual or class action suits were the best way to proceed, Exxon 
settled with over 10,000 claimants for a total of $235 million.241  
Exxon encouraged settlement by making litigation as complicated 
and intimidating as possible for potential plaintiffs, consistently 
challenging who had standing to sue or be sued.  In litigation, typi-
cal defenses Exxon employed included: (1) the “who me?” (arguing 
that Bligh Reef was not well marked and/or government officials 
were to blame for clean-up damages because Exxon was following 
government orders); (2) the “why are you whining?”(arguing that 
fishers’ and cannery workers’ lost wages could be offset by wages 
earned for spill clean-up); (3) the “haven’t we suffered enough?” 
(arguing that punitive damage awards in one case should bar puni-
tive awards in another); and (4) the “stiff arm” of precedent set in 
 
 236. On the lawyers’ rush to Alaska following the spill, see DAVID LEBEDOFF, 
CLEANING UP: THE STORY BEHIND THE BIGGEST LEGAL BONANZA OF OUR TIME 
(1997) (especially ch. 4). 
 237. See 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(3) (2000) (discussing liability caps and the Trans-
Alaska Pipeline Liability Fund); Oct. 1991 Consent Decree, supra note 5, at ¶ 19.  
Compare generally 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1655 with D. Alan Rudlin, Packaging Toxic 
Tort Cases for Trial: Use of Test Cases, Bifurcation and Class Actions, 406 PLI/LIT 
185 (1991) and Keeva, supra note 2, at 67–68. 
 238. Jenkins & Kastner, supra note 2, at 170 (“If the total claims allowed ex-
ceed $100 million, each person’s claims are reduced proportionately.”). 
 239. Darrin J. Quam, Right to Subsist: The Alaska Natives’ Campaign to Re-
cover Damages Caused by the Exxon Valdez Spill, 5 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 
177, 185–86 (1992). 
 240. Jenkins & Kastner, supra note 2, at 155. 
 241. Id.  “By 1995, Exxon had paid more than $304 million in settlement of 
private claims through the Claims Program.”  Id. at 179. 
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Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint242 (precluding recovery of 
economic losses “absent physical damage to a proprietary inter-
est”).243 
Exxon established a program for fishers whose claims looked 
like clear courtroom winners, paying the fishers’ net average in-
come for the preceding three seasons prior to the spill.244  In 1994, 
Exxon settled with various municipalities and with a class of Alaska 
Native subsistence users, at a cost just over $214 million.245 
Exxon strategically employed a divide-and-conquer strategy 
for compensatory damages but pushed for and won a broad manda-
tory class certification on the award of punitive damages.246  With-
out the opt-out clause of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) 
certification,247 Exxon was able to consolidate all potential punitive 
claims and delay payment of damages.  To date, no plaintiff has 
received any of the $5 billion award.248  Yet Exxon is alleged to earn 
about 18% on its investments, while the unpaid punitive award ac-
crues interest at a mere 6%.249  At this rate, it appears the punitive 
damage award (and the tax-deductible legal expenses for the end-
less stream of motions challenging it) could soon pay for itself. 
Exxon’s voluntary payment strategy was successful on many 
levels.  For one, the claims program was an effective public rela-
tions tool, as Exxon publicized its payments to highly visible and 
sympathetic candidates (i.e. fishers).  Early settlement also saved 
Exxon from the headache of further litigation, a strategy that paid 
off well for the company (as discussed below).250  However, perhaps 
the greatest benefit to Exxon was arranging and entrenching a 
damages standard before the affected parties realized the potential 
extent of the damages.  Alaska Governor Tony Knowles wrote to 
 
 242. 275 U.S. 303 (1927). 
 243. See Richard Mauer, Exxon Responds to 140 Lawsuits, ANCHORAGE DAILY 
NEWS, Aug. 16, 1989, at A1. 
 244. N. Robert Stoll, Litigating and Managing a Mass Disaster Case: An Oregon 
Plaintiff Lawyer’s Experience in the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Litigation, 56-OCT. 
OR. ST. B. BULL. 14, 19 (1995). 
 245. Id. 
 246. Jenkins & Kastner, supra note 2 at 161. 
 247. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 248. This is because the case has bounced back-and-forth between the Ninth 
Circuit and the District of Alaska.  See, e.g., In re Exxon Valdez, 296 F.Supp.2d 
1071 (D. Alaska 2004) (appeal pending). 
 249. 60 Minutes: Ten Years Later (CBS Television Broadcast Mar. 21, 1999) 
(estimating 6.5 years for Exxon to generate investment accrual to pay the judg-
ment). 
 250. See discussion infra pt. II(D)(6)(b). 
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Exxon in December 2001, offering the resources of his office to fa-
cilitate resolution of outstanding claims by Alaskans in the wake of 
the Ninth Circuit decision on punitive damages.251  Exxon re-
sponded a month later, pointing out that all actual damages were 
already paid, and only unpaid punitive damages remained an issue.  
Faced with only the punitive damages issue, Exxon was able to 
wash its hands of actual damages left in Alaska. 
Clearly, Exxon sought cost certainty.  Recognizing the enor-
mity of the disaster, Exxon was extremely proactive in setting the 
price of its own liability.  Exxon’s desire for certainty also explains 
its fear of the Reopener, which represents open-ended liability for 
future spills.  Thus, the Reopener is a dangerous proposition from 
Exxon’s point of view. 
3. Quick Settlement of NRD Claims.  The successful settle-
ment of the NRD claims can only look better to Exxon with each 
passing year.  In March 1991, the United States and the State of 
Alaska, acting as trustees for the public, sued Exxon.252  As men-
tioned above, the three parties reached a civil and criminal settle-
ment that was approved by the district court on October 8, 1991.  
The resulting Consent Decree stated that the state and federal gov-
ernments would recover compensatory and remedial relief in their 
capacity “to act on behalf of the public as trustees of Natural Re-
sources to recover damages for injury to Natural Resources arising 
from the Oil Spill.”253  The inclusion of this clause in the Consent 
Decree invoked the doctrine of res judicata and purports to bar 
claims brought by other plaintiffs for damages to natural resources 
caused by the oil spill.254  Thus, after the approval of the 1991 set-
tlement agreement, the only actionable claims could be those of 
trustees not represented or of parties suffering damages different 
from those incurred by the general public.255 
From Exxon’s perspective, the quick settlement of the NRD 
claims was a triumph.  Though the settlement amount was at the 
time unprecedented, it did not approach Exxon’s annual profits of 
 
 251. Letter from Alaska Gov. Tony Knowles to Exxon Corp. (Dec. 28, 2001) 
(responding to decision in In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2001)) (on 
file with author). 
 252. Alaska v. Exxon, No. A91-083 CV (D. Alaska Mar. 15, 1991); United   
States v. Exxon, No. A91-082 CV (D. Alaska Mar. 13, 1991). 
 253. See Oct. 1991 Consent Decree, supra note 5, at 3. 
 254. Jenkins & Kastner, supra note 2, at 185–86. 
 255. Id. 
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$5 billion.256  More importantly, the civil settlement insulated Exxon 
from NRD claims beyond $900 million.257 
The $100 million Reopener was a small, albeit unwelcome, 
concession in Exxon’s broader strategy—for the governments, it 
served as a sweetener that would facilitate approval of the settle-
ment.258  In 1991, the Exxon legal team believed that the contingen-
cies anticipated by the Reopener were remote and unlikely; if for 
some reason they came to pass, the company would likely be able 
to block the issue at that time.  Moreover, $100 million was not a 
significant amount and chances for recovering it seemed slim. 
4. Strategic Settlement of the Chenega Bay Case.  The Native 
tribes were parties to neither the lawsuits nor the settlement be-
tween Exxon and the federal and state governments.  These tribes 
represented a grave threat to the NRD settlement, but their ad-
vances were repelled in Chenega Bay.259 
In March 1991, after unsuccessful attempts to participate in 
negotiations on the pending settlement between the Alaska and 
federal governments and Exxon,260 the Native Village of Chenega 
Bay and other Native villages and corporations261 sued in the Dis-
 
 256. Id. at 188. 
 257. Oct. 1991 Consent Decree, supra note 5, at 7. 
 258. See Keith Schneider, In Exxon Deal, Transportation Chief Wins Another 
One for the President, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1991, at A18. 
 259. Native Vill. of Chenega Bay v. Lujan, Nos. 91-483, 91-484 CV, 1991 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 2986 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 1991) (Memorandum Opinion and Order). 
 260. Quam, supra note 239, at 182. 
 261. The “Native Interests” included the following tribes, villages and corpora-
tions, grouped into two broad classes.  First, the Alaska Native Class: all Alaska 
Natives, all traditional Native organizations and other Native entities who have or 
may have claims against the State of Alaska or the United States arising out of the 
Exxon Valdez oil spill, including all those who engage in, rely upon, promote, pre-
serve, or provide services for, wholly or in part, a subsistence way of life in the 
following areas: Native Village of Chenega Bay, Eyak Native Village, Port Gra-
ham Village, the Native Village of English Bay, the Native Village of Tatitlek, the 
Native Village of Kodiak, the Native Village of Larsen Bay, the Native Village of 
Karluk, the Native Village of Port Lions, the Native Village of Akhiok, the Native 
Village of Ouzinke, Ivanoff Bay Village, the Native Village of Chignik Bay, Sew-
ard, Valdez, the Native Village of Chignik Lagoon, Chignik Lake Village and the 
Native Village of Perryville, the Kenai Peninsula Borough, the Kodiak Island 
Borough, the Lake and Peninsula Borough and the Aleutians East Borough.  Sec-
ond, the ANCSA Corporation Class: all Native Corporations, as that termed is 
used within the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, as amended, 43 U.S.C. §§ 
1601–05, who have or may have claims against the State of Alaska or the United 
States arising out of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, including all those who are legal or 
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trict Court for the District of Columbia for an injunction prevent-
ing the settlement.262  In these consolidated cases, the Native inter-
ests argued that the proposed deal between the government entities 
and Exxon would compromise individual plaintiffs’ rights to seek 
relief against Exxon and Alyeska.263  The Native interests asserted a 
right to act as trustees for NRD recovery because the Natives de-
pended on the impacted resources to sustain subsistence cultures.  
They also argued for government consultation with them, before 
damage assessments or restoration activities could be performed on 
Native lands.264  In opposition, the governments countered that 
“resolution of the [United States’ NRD claims] should not impair 
rights or claims of third parties.”265  Judge Stanley Sporkin inter-
preted this claim to mean that “Exxon and Alyeska may be liable 
to the plaintiffs for damages to natural resources and/or lands they 
have an interest in, even if it is claimed the same natural resources 
and/or lands are covered by the settlement agreement among [the 
governments] and Exxon and Alyeska.”266  Thus, Judge Sporkin 
denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction,267 but re-
tained jurisdiction to “ensure that the defendants’ representations 
are carried out so that plaintiffs’ rights are protected.”268  In April 
1991, the court found that the proposed settlement between the 
governments and Exxon might interfere with the natural resources 
rights of Alaska Natives.269  Judge Sporkin ordered discovery to as-
certain if Exxon intended to use the civil settlement against the Na-
tive interests.270  In his deposition, the Chairman of Exxon re-
sponded that the interests of Alaska Natives were not even consid-
ered in the proposed settlement.271 
After successfully delaying the government-Exxon settlement 
for seven months, and possibly influencing a slightly higher crimi-
 
equitable owners of real property in the geographic area encompassed by the 
Alaska Native Class.  See Chenega Consent Decree, supra note 45, at ¶ 2. 
 262. Native Vill. of Chenega Bay, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2986. 
 263. Id. at *1. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. at *2. 
 267. Id. at *3. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Quam, supra note 239, at 184. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
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nal penalty against Exxon,272 the Native interests consented to their 
own settlement with the governments in September 1991.273 
In the agreement between the governments and the Natives, 
the governments retained all rights to act as trustees for natural 
resources, and excluded the Native interests from acting as co-
trustees.274  The Natives gave up any right to sue for, receive, or 
control the use of any NRD recoveries arising from the oil spill.275 
However, the governments recognized that the Native inter-
ests retained the rights to pursue claims for all private harms result-
ing from injuries caused by the oil spill.276  Though the governments 
promised to “endeavor to restore the natural resources injured by 
the oil spill, including those resources used for subsistence,” noth-
ing in the Consent Decree required 
either Government to take any action which, in its judgment, is 
unnecessary or inappropriate in light of statutory and other legal 
standards applicable to damage assessment or restoration proc-
ess or to allocate, set aside, or expend any portion of any natural 
resource damage recovery received by the Governments for the 
specific purpose of restoring natural resources used for subsis-
tence.277 
The governments also agreed to obtain consent from the ap-
propriate Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (“ANCSA”) Cor-
poration Class278 prior to conducting damage assessments or resto-
ration activities on Corporation lands,279 and, as required by federal 
and state law, to consider the views of the Corporation Class prior 
to making decisions regarding such assessments and activities on 
lands which the corporations had selected but were not yet con-
 
 272. Id. at 178. 
 273. See generally Chenega Consent Decree, supra note 45. 
 274. Id. at ¶ 5. 
 275. Id. at ¶ 6. 
 276. Id. at ¶¶ 7, 8.  A primary goal of the Native Corporations was preservation 
of their property interests in these lands in “interim jurisdiction.”  The corpora-
tions successfully lobbied Congress to include a provision in the 1990 OPA to vest 
the corporations with title, as of March 23, 1989 (the day before the spill), to lands 
they had already selected.  The Native villages’ interests were not the same as the 
Native corporations; they instead wanted to preserve their right to sue Exxon for 
economic, subsistence, and natural resource damages and to establish a fund that 
would be administered by Alaska Natives to monitor the environment and ecology 
of the area.  See Quam, supra note 239, at 190. 
 277. Chenega Consent Decree, supra note 45, at ¶ 9. 
 278. Id. at ¶ 9; see also id. at ¶ 2(b) (defining ANCSA as a settlement class). 
 279. Id. at ¶ 10. 
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veyed to the corporation.280  The Corporation Class agreed to allow 
the governments to access their lands for such activities.281 
The Native interests were granted representatives on any pub-
lic advisory groups that might be established in the future.282  More-
over, the United States and the Native interests agreed to com-
mence a joint study on the impact of the oil spill on natural re-
sources used for subsistence.283  Though Alaska was not required to 
participate in the study, it retained the right to gain access to study 
results and monitor its progress.284  The governments agreed to pro-
vide scientific data for the study to the Native interests.285  The Na-
tive interests considered this provision a victory because the United 
States government was previously unwilling to share the results of 
studies it conducted in anticipation of litigation with Exxon.286  The 
Native interests intended to use this information in their pending 
civil suit against Exxon.287 
Finally, and probably most importantly with respect to the 
Reopener, the settlement between the Native interests and the 
governments resulted in dismissal of the complaints filed in the 
D.C. district court.288  Any Alaska Native interest intervening to 
enforce the Reopener must overcome the preclusive effect of this 
decree.  One way to circumvent this effect is to note that the word 
“tribes” did not appear in the definition of “Alaska Native 
Class.”289  Moreover, Reopener claims did not exist at the time of 
this Chenega Bay settlement; they did not exist until the principal 
case was settled the following month. 
If Native representatives in this case actually “settled” future 
claims for unknown NRD, then questions arise over public trust or 
federal Indian trust limitations on the authority of trustees to dis-
pose of their patrimony in this manner. 
5. Successful Defense of the Exclusivity of the NRD Settlement 
Process.  Perhaps Exxon’s greatest “success” during the litigation 
 
 280. Id. at ¶ 12. 
 281. Id. at ¶ 11. 
 282. Id. at ¶ 13. 
 283. Id. at ¶ 14. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id.  This study is discussed above, in pt. II(C)(2)(c). 
 286. See Ann D. Cummings, The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill and the Confidentiality 
of Natural Resource Damage Assessment Date, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 363, 364–65 
(1992). 
 287. Id. at 366. 
 288. Chenega Consent Decree, supra note 45, at ¶ 23. 
 289. Id. at ¶ 2. 
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and settlement was the transformation of the NRD process from 
one in which many parties could sue for money damages and broad 
equitable remedies to one in which only the United States and the 
State of Alaska could merely seek the narrowest of injunctions.  
This process unfolded in two steps. 
a. Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon.  In June 1989, 
the Alaska Sport Fishing Association (“ASFA”) filed a class action 
in Alaska Superior Court on behalf of an estimated 130,000 recrea-
tional sport fishers who used Prince William Sound and other areas 
affected by the Exxon Valdez oil spill.290  The plaintiffs sought in-
junctive relief and damages “to provide for an environmental miti-
gation and monitoring fund.”291  In August 1989, the National Wild-
life Federation, Natural Resources Defense Council, and Wildlife 
Federation of Alaska also sued,292 seeking to establish a conserva-
tion trust fund to restore the ecology of the oil spill area, to protect 
the area from further environmental harm, to restore wildlife popu-
lations on land and in the sea, to fund scientific studies and moni-
toring, and to acquire resources equivalent to those lost in the 
spill.293  These suits were later consolidated.294 
The October 1991 Consent Decree defined NRD to include 
“remedial relief recoverable by the Governments in their capacity 
as trustees of Natural Resources . . . under any federal or state stat-
ute or maritime or common law relating to the environment.”295  
Exxon moved for removal of the consolidated cases to federal 
court and for summary judgment, arguing that the suit was in dero-
gation of the Consent Decree.296  The district court granted Exxon’s 
motion, ruling that the plaintiffs were in privity with the govern-
ments in entering into the Consent Decree, and that res judicata 
precluded further claims for public relief.297  In 1994, the Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court’s ruling.298  Though the district court 
 
 290. Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon, 34 F.3d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1994) (cit-
ing Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv., No. 3AN-89-5188 CV 
(Alaska Super. Ct. 1989)). 
 291. Id. 
 292. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Exxon Corp., No. 3AN-89-6957 CV (Alaska Super. 
Ct. filed Aug. 17, 1989), cited in Eyak Native Vill. v. Exxon Corp., 25 F.3d 773, 
775–76 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 293. See Eyak Native Vill., 25 F.3d at 776. 
 294. Id. 
 295. See Oct. 1991 Consent Decree, supra note 5, at ¶ 6 (emphasis added). 
 296. Eyak Native Vill., 25 F.3d at 776. 
 297. See Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon, 34 F.3d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 298. Eyak Native Vill., 25 F.3d at 781. 
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allowed ASFA to amend its complaint to “better allege their 
uniquely private claims,”299 the court ultimately was “convinced 
that the sport fishermen were unable to allege private claims be-
cause these plaintiffs suffered no private injury.”300  The Ninth Cir-
cuit upheld the lower court ruling, finding that the Consent Decree 
was res judicata and covered all “lost use” damages and that the 
plaintiffs, in privity with the governments under the parens patriae 
doctrine, had been represented by the governments when the gov-
ernments entered into the Consent Decree.301 
The plight of the Alaska sport fishermen and the environ-
mental groups exemplified how the courts took an anti-plaintiff 
stance in private suits brought in response to the oil spill.302  Com-
mentators have argued that there is a substantial difference be-
tween active and passive loss of use.303  Nevertheless, the holding in 
this case confirms that whenever the government enters into a set-
tlement decree, res judicata and parens patriae can be used to 
quash all remaining NRD claims, even in the face of allegations 
that the government did not act in the best interest of private par-
ties or the public resource.304 
b. In re Native Class.  As described above, Alaska Na-
tives brought a class action suit against Exxon, seeking damages for 
the loss of their subsistence way of life.305  Originally, the class was 
composed of all Alaska Natives and Native organizations.306  Sub-
sequently, the class was limited to 3,455 individual Natives (thereby 
 
 299. Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n, 34 F.3d at 771. 
 300. Id. at 772. 
 301. Id. at 771–73. 
 302. See Scott Kerin, Alaska Sport Fishing Association v. Exxon Corp. High-
lights the Need to Take a Hard Look at the Doctrine of Parens Patriae When Ap-
plied in Natural Resource Damage Litigation, 25 ENVTL. L. 897, 908–09 (1995). 
 303. Id. 
 304. See id. 
 305. Christopher V. Panoff, In re The Exxon Valdez Alaska Native Class v. 
Exxon Corp.: Cultural Resources, Subsistence Living, and the Special Injury Rule, 
28 ENVTL. L. 701, 703–04, n.14 (1998) (“In addition to claimed damage to a subsis-
tence way of life, the complaint alleged injury to archaeological sites and artifacts, 
natural resources and property upon which the plaintiffs depend as part of their 
natural habitat and lives” and defining “subsistence way of life” as “dependent 
upon the preservation of uncontaminated natural resources, marine life and wild-
life, and reflects a personal, economic, psychological, social, cultural, communal 
and religious form of daily living”). 
 306. Id. at 703 n.13. 
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excluding Native villages and government entities).307  The suit was 
filed in state court but removed to federal court,308 where the claims 
were split into: (1) economic damages due to loss of harvest, and 
(2) non-economic damages due to injury to the subsistence cul-
ture.309  The Native class settled with Exxon for the economic dam-
ages.310  The court then granted Exxon’s motion for summary judg-
ment on all non-economic injuries.311 
In his decision dismissing the case, Judge Holland declared 
that “[t]he law remains that a private litigant cannot recover dam-
ages for a public nuisance unless he or she can show a special injury 
different in kind from that suffered by the general public.”312  The 
class argued that the “unique nature of their subsistence lifestyle 
[was] the keystone to their culture.”313  This “special injury” rule is 
a relic that restricts private standing to correct public nuisances 
“ostensibly . . . to protect defendants from a multiplicity of actions, 
to discourage trivial lawsuits, and to prevent interference with the 
discretion of public authorities.”314  It was applied in this case to 
protect defendants from the only meaningful action that could be 
brought to correct the subsistence injury. 
Though a private claimant who suffers an injury different from 
the public-at-large can bring suit to correct a public nuisance, Judge 
Holland chose the narrow version of this rule—the difference must 
be not only in degree but in kind—and then reasoned that the Na-
tives’ subsistence-culture claim was common to the public, taking 
judicial notice “of the fact that hunting and fishing for the family 
table is traditional throughout all of rural America.”315  The court 
likened the subsistence lifestyle to hunting and fishing à la Daniel 
Boone and noted that, “all Alaskans, and not just Alaska Natives, 
 
 307. Id.  The Native Corporations settled their lawsuit with the TAPF for 
$23.27 million and with Alyeska for $5.69 million.  Id.  A subsequent jury verdict 
against Exxon for $5.9 million in damages to land and archaeological resources 
was offset by the TAPF and Alyeska payment.  See Chenega Corp. v. Exxon, 991 
P.2d 769, 775 (Alaska 1999). 
 308. Panoff, supra note 305, at 704. 
 309. Id. 
 310. See Bardwick, supra note 126, at 278. 
 311. Panoff, supra note 305, at 703–04. 
 312. In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-095 CV, 1994 WL 182856, at *1 (D. Alaska 
Mar. 23, 1994) (unreported). 
 313. Id. at *2. 
 314. W.H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR & WATER § 2.2, at 36 
(Vol. 1, West 1986) (footnotes omitted).  See also Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing 
Public Nuisance: Solving the Paradox of the Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOL. L. Q. 
755 (2001). 
 315. In re Exxon Valdez, 1994 WL 182856, at *2. 
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have the right to obtain and share wild food, enjoy uncontaminated 
nature, and cultivate traditional, cultural, spiritual, and psychologi-
cal benefits in pristine natural surroundings.”316  According to Judge 
Holland, neither the length of time in which Alaska Natives have 
practiced subsistence nor the manner in which they practice it 
makes their lifestyle sufficiently unique.317 
In dicta, the court drove the final nail in the coffin of Alaska 
Native subsistence claims by concluding that the degradation of the 
Native subsistence lifestyle began well in advance of the oil spill: 
We are powerless to prevent change; and accidents are no 
stranger to human existence. . . . However, one’s culture—a per-
son’s way of life—is deeply embedded in the mind and heart.  
Even catastrophic cultural impacts cannot change what is in the 
mind or in the heart unless we lose the will to pursue a given way 
of life.  If (and we think this is not the case) the Native culture 
was in such distress that the Exxon Valdez oil spill sapped the 
will of the Native peoples to carry on their way of life, then a Na-
tive subsistence lifestyle was already lost before March 24, 
1989.318 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court without hesita-
tion, agreeing that the non-economic cultural claims were “poten-
tially different in degree” but not “different in kind” from the inju-
ries suffered by other Alaskans.319  Natives could not sue to correct 
the cultural wrongs any more than the EVOS Trustee Council 
could move to correct them.  All dissent was buried in law jour-
nals320 and in the disappointments of the Native people who had 
been turned away.  Exxon “won” millions in damage forgiveness 
for its remorse; the Natives got nothing for their distress.  Trigger-
ing the Reopener Clause could alleviate some of this suffering by 
allocating an additional $100 million to aid the recovery of species 
and habitat the Alaska Natives rely on for their subsistence way of 
life. 
6. The Slow Decline in Punitive Damages. 
a. 5 Billion to 4 Billion to 4.5 Billion.  The punitive dam-
ages phase of the Exxon Valdez case was born in a creative flourish 
 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. (“These attributes of the Alaska Native lifestyle only make it different 
in degree from the same subsistence lifestyle available to all Alaskans.”). 
 318. Id. at *4. 
 319. In re Native Class, 104 F.3d 1196, 1198 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 320. E.g., Bardwick, supra note 126, at 281. 
110805 02_RODGERS.DOC 1/3/2006  4:49 PM 
184 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [22:2 
that gives high hope to students of law.321  It has slowly succumbed 
to the more cynical details of the legal process. 
The proceedings to assess punitive damages began with the 
certification of a mandatory punitive damages class in 1994 under 
the direction of Judge Holland.322  The class included all persons 
who possessed or asserted claims for punitive damages against 
Exxon.323  The formation of one punitive damages class was done 
primarily for legal efficiency and equality.324  It insured that Exxon 
would not be punished numerous times and that all plaintiffs could 
recover damages.325  On May 2, 1994, the federal trial commenced.  
In Phase 1 of the three-part trial, the jury unanimously found that 
both Captain Hazelwood and Exxon recklessly caused the acci-
dent.326  In Phase 2, the jury returned a verdict awarding compensa-
tory damages of $287 million for losses relating to the spill.327  On 
September 16, 1994, the verdict for Phase 3, assessing punitive 
damages, resulted in an award of $5 billion.328  After the verdict was 
announced, the plaintiff’s lawyer hugged his three-year old son as 
an attorney for Exxon whispered, “he’ll be in college before you 
get any of that money.”329  So far, those words have been prophetic, 
as Exxon has not paid any of the punitive damages awarded.330 
The punitive damages case reached the Ninth Circuit in 1999.331  
In the interim, Exxon filed “more than 60 petitions and appeals, 
sought 23 time extensions and filed more than 1,000 motions, 
briefs, requests and demands,” requesting a reduction in the dam-
ages amount, a reversal, and a new trial, while also claiming jury 
misconduct and jury tampering.332  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit va-
cated and remanded the punitive damages award.333  The lower 
 
 321. See LEBEDOFF, supra note 236, passim. 
 322. Jenkins & Kastner, supra note 2, at 158. 
 323. Id. 
 324. Id. at 160. 
 325. Id. 
 326. In re Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp.2d 1071, 1080 (D. Alaska 1994). 
 327. Id. 
 328. Jenkins & Kastner, supra note 2, at 192. 
 329. Mark Curriden, Exxon Finds Slow Pace of Valdez Case Profitable: Com-
pany Says Fairness, Not Money, Is the Issue, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 14, 
1999, at A1. 
 330. See Jenkins & Kastner, supra note 2, at 192; see also Gargi Chakrabarty, 
Protests Aim to Exxpose Exxon, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Jul. 13, 2005, at 7B 
(protesters angry that Exxon has not paid all punitives; Exxon argues that punitive 
award is excessive). 
 331. In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 332. Curriden, supra note 329, at A1. 
 333. In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1254. 
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court was ordered to apply the three “guideposts” set out by the 
Supreme Court in BMW of North America v. Gore334: (1) the de-
gree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct; (2) the ratio 
between the harm or potential harm suffered by the victim and the 
amount of punitive damages awarded; and (3) the comparison be-
tween the punitives and other criminal or civil penalties authorized 
by law or imposed in like cases.335  In applying this test, the Ninth 
Circuit found, first, because the spill was an accident and Exxon 
acted promptly to mitigate its effects, its reprehensibility was re-
duced.336  Second, the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages 
was seventeen-to-one, which exceeded the four-to-one ratio the 
Supreme Court called “close to the line” in Pacific Mutual Life In-
surance Co. v. Haslip.337  Finally, the Court determined that the pu-
nitive damages award far exceeded other comparable penalties and 
those allowable under the Oil Pollution Act.338  Based on these fac-
tors, the district court was ordered to reduce the amount of puni-
tive damages.339 
The district court reevaluated the amount of punitive damages 
awarded and determined that $5 billion did not violate due process 
as described in BMW v. Gore.340  In applying the Gore factors, the 
court found that Exxon’s conduct was highly reprehensible.341  Also, 
in its calculation, the court fixed the ratio of punitive harm to quan-
tifiable damages at 9.85-to-1, which does not exceed the ten-to-one 
ratio upheld in TXO Production Corp v. Alliance Resources 
Corp.342  The court calculated the amount of quantifiable damages 
by adding up all the payments made by Exxon, to arrive at an 
amount of “actual harm” equal to $507,509,094.343  Judge Holland 
totaled twenty-one awards, payments, and settlements to reach this 
figure.344  Finally, the court determined that the penalty was appro-
 
 334. 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 335. Id. at 574–75. 
 336. In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1243. 
 337. Id. (quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991)). 
 338. Id. at 1241–46. 
 339. Id. at 1246–47. 
 340. In re Exxon Valdez, 236 F.Supp.2d 1043, 1068 (D. Alaska 2002). 
 341. Id. at 1057 (knowing that Captain Hazelwood was an alcoholic and drink-
ing on duty, leaving him in command “demonstrated reckless disregard for the 
livelihood, health, and safety of the residents of Prince William Sound, the crew of 
the Exxon Valdez, and others”). 
 342. Id. (citing TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993)). 
 343. Id. at 1060. 
 344. Id. at 1058–60. 
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priate based on comparable misconduct.345  Despite the ratio of pu-
nitive to actual harm falling within an acceptable limit, the court 
found that the award had to be reduced to $4 billion to comply with 
the Ninth Circuit’s mandate.346  Exxon again appealed the amount 
of the award.347 
In August 2003, the Ninth Circuit vacated the $4 billion puni-
tive damages judgment and remanded the case to the district court 
to reconsider the punitive damages award in light of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. 
Campbell.348  In reassessing actual harm yet again, Judge Holland 
considered twenty-four awards, payments, and settlements, to 
reach a total of $513,147,740.349  In January 2004 the district court 
held that the imposition of $5 billion in punitive damages would not 
violate the State Farm principle that punitive damages could not be 
used to punish and deter a defendant for conduct that happened in 
another jurisdiction (following the rule that a court may not con-
sider extraterritorial conduct that has no nexus to the harm suf-
fered by plaintiffs).350  The court also found that the punitive award 
of $5 billion would not violate Exxon’s due process rights.351  Fi-
nally, Judge Holland reduced the award to $4.5 billion, again to 
comply with the Ninth Circuit’s remand order.352 
b. The Seattle Seven Interlude.  A telling component of 
this litigation involves claims brought by the “Seattle Seven,” a 
group of seafood processors.353  On January 8, 1991, the Seattle 
Seven entered into a confidential $70 million settlement with 
Exxon.354  In exchange for $70 million, the Seattle Seven agreed to 
release their claims against Exxon and “take all reasonable, lawful 
and ethical  . . . actions to assist Exxon so that Exxon may recapture 
or obtain a credit or offset for any punitive damages, awards, set-
 
 345. Id. at 1061. 
 346. Id. at 1068. 
 347. In re Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1075, 1084–85 (D. Alaska 2004). 
 348. Id. (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 
(2003)). 
 349. Id. at 1099–1101. 
 350. Id. at 1090–91. 
 351. Id. at 1110. 
 352. Id. 
 353. See Jenkins & Kastner, supra note 2, at 201–04 (discussing In re Exxon 
Valdez, No. A89-095 CV, 1996 WL 384623, at *7 (D. Alaska June 11, 1996), aff’d, 
No. 97-35208 DC, 1998 WL 536878 (9th Cir. Aug. 17, 1998)). 
 354. Id. at 201–02. 
110805 02_RODGERS.DOC 1/3/2006  4:49 PM 
2005] EXXON VALDEZ REOPENER 187 
tlements, and claims.”355  They agreed to challenge the “Plan of Al-
location” of punitive damages and to use their share to reimburse 
Exxon (over $700 million).356  The payoff, if successful, would be 
$12 million.  The district court rejected this secret agreement on 
public policy grounds,357 but the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding 
that the cede-back provisions were enforceable but should not be 
disclosed to the jury.358 
Exxon has done everything legally possible to delay its pay-
ment of the awarded punitive damages.  This litigation effort was 
tortured in the appellate process and by Exxon’s questionable mo-
tives.359  Six times Exxon went to the Ninth Circuit, which resulted 
in six wins for Exxon.  The district court’s most recent order, set-
ting punitive damages at $4.5 billion, is pending a hearing before 
the court of appeals.  By delaying its payment, Exxon continues to 
accrue interest on its debt to society, limiting the impact of the pu-
nitive damages as a means of punishing and deterring reckless be-
havior. 
E. Double Hulls and Margins of Tolerance 
The Oil Pollution Act was a response to the tragedy of the 
1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill.  Congress did much to fix the deficien-
cies that were on conspicuous display post-EVOS: it even took 
steps to redesign petroleum tankers by the simple expedient of 
mandating double hulls in tanker design and construction.360 
Congress thought it had discovered a silver-bullet solution 
with this technological change.  Exxon, on the other hand, fought 
imposition of such a requirement throughout the legislative proc-
ess.361  In the Senate, efforts to mandate double hulls were narrowly 
defeated.362  In the House, a provision compelled double hulls to be 
phased-in over fifteen years,363 and a phase-out of single hull tank-
 
 355. Id. 
 356. Id.  at 202. 
 357. See In re Exxon Valdez, 1996 WL 384623, at *12. 
 358. See In re Exxon Valdez, 229 F.3d 790, 800–01 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 359. See Jenkins & Kastner, supra note 2, at 205–08.  While Exxon asserts that 
it is just “exercising [its] legal right[s] to appeal an unjust verdict,” critics point out 
that Exxon maintains control of the penalty and can invest it to realize a higher 
rate of return than the federally mandated 5.9%.  See 60 Minutes: Ten Years Later, 
supra note 249. 
 360. See Russell V. Randle, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Its Provisions, Intent, 
and Effects, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. 10119, 10119 (March 1991). 
 361. Id. at 10132. 
 362. Id. 
 363. Id. 
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ers was to begin in 1995.  By 2010, all vessels over 5,000 gross tons 
with single hulls are to be prohibited from operating until con-
verted to double hulled vessels.364  The Congressional margin of 
tolerance for double hulls was twenty years.  This requirement has 
had no impact on Exxon traffic in Prince William Sound since the 
1989 spill.365 
Double hulls were “a road not taken” in the 1990 OPA, and it 
is a road that beckons again during the 2002-2006 Reopener win-
dow.  The Sound could be significantly protected if every penny of 
the Reopener’s $100 million were sent back to Exxon with instruc-
tions to invest it in putting double hulls on its tanker fleet that 
moves Valdez oil. 
III.  THE ROAD TO BE TAKEN: APPLYING THE REOPENER 
A. Legal Conditions 
To trigger the Reopener, it is necessary to demonstrate that: 
(1) “populations, habitats, or species” have suffered losses or de-
clines in the area of the spill; (2) these losses are “substantial”; (3) 
the losses must result from the oil spill; (4) the losses could not 
have been reasonably known or anticipated by the trustees; (5) res-
toration projects must be identifiable and set forth in a “restoration 
plan”; and (6) the costs of any project “must not be grossly dispro-
portionate to the magnitude of the benefits anticipated from the 
remediation.”366 
1. Have “One or More Populations, Habitats, or Species” Suf-
fered a “Substantial Loss or Substantial Decline in the Areas Af-
fected by the Oil Spill”?  The short answer to this question is that 
many populations, habitats, and species have suffered losses and 
declines in Prince William Sound, and these declines have been 
substantial.  For example, an impressive summary of consequences 
appeared in a 2003 Science article, which concluded powerfully: 
[O]il persisted beyond a decade in surprising amounts and in 
toxic forms, was sufficiently bioavailable to induce chronic bio-
 
 364. Id. 
 365. See Eric Nalder, Safety Lapses Plague Tankers: Post-Exxon Valdez 
Changes in Oil Carrier Operations Are Being Evaded, Undermined, P-I Investiga-
tion Shows, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 22, 2005, at A1, A6, (Conoco 
“endorsed double hulls immediately after the Exxon Valdez spill and built 
them. . . . By contrast, Exxon’s fleet hasn’t launched any new double-hulled ships 
for the Alaska trade and, under the law, it might not be able to sail its old ships 
into Prince William Sound . . . in about two years.”). 
 366. Oct. 1991 Consent Decree, supra note 5, at 19. 
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logical exposures, and had long-term impacts at the population 
level.  Three major pathways of induction of long-term impacts 
emerge: (i) chronic persistence of oil, biological exposures, and 
population impacts to species closely associated with shallow 
sediments; (ii) delayed population impacts of sublethal doses 
compromising health, growth, and reproduction; and (iii) indi-
rect effects of trophic and interaction cascades, all of which 
transmit impacts well beyond the acute-phase mortality.367 
In layman’s terms, the article concluded that populations, 
habitats, and species continue to be exposed to oil in toxic amounts 
in Prince William Sound, and these exposures compromise the 
health, growth, and reproduction of individual animals with resul-
tant population effects.  There is scientific documentation of these 
losses across the species that populate the Sound; elaboration of 
the oil spill’s effects on a few selected species and environments is 
supplied below. 
2. How to Measure “Substantial” Declines in Populations, 
Habitats, or Species? 
a. Generally.  The test of whether the environmental 
damages fall below a legally acceptable norm is inescapable in en-
vironmental law and crucial to the resolution of the Exxon Valdez 
Reopener.  The common law of nuisance368 and public trust369 meas-
ures violation by reference to whether an injury is “substantial.”  
The Endangered Species Act and CERCLA (to mention two ex-
amples) demand somewhat different levels of improvement to the 
environmental baseline—the first, at which listed species are fully 
“recovered,”370 and the second, at which human health is fully pro-
tected.371 
Contestants in the Exxon Valdez litigation have used different 
standards of recovery at different times.  The EVOS Trustee Coun-
cil first defined recovery as “a return to pre-spill conditions or to 
conditions comparable to those of unoiled areas.”372  On the other 
side, Exxon’s Alan W. Maki has invoked indicators such as no-
effects exposure levels and successful survival, reproduction, and 
 
 367. Charles H. Peterson et al., Long-Term Ecosystem Response to the Exxon 
Valdez Oil Spill, 302 SCIENCE 2082, 2082 (2003) [hereinafter Ecosystem Response]. 
 368. W.H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR & WATER, Vol. 1, §§ 2.4, 
2.5 (1986). 
 369. Id. § 2.20. 
 370. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (2000) (recovery plans). 
 371. See W.H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: HAZARDOUS WASTES & 
SUBSTANCES, Vol. 4, § 8.10 (1992). 
 372. RESTORATION PLAN, supra note 7, at 35. 
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re-colonization of oiled areas to confirm that “biological recovery is 
rapidly taking place.”373 
The 1991 settlement rests on the Clean Water Act, which di-
rects public trustees to “restore, rehabilitate or acquire the equiva-
lent” of natural resources.374  By dictionary definition, “restore” 
means to “bring back to an original condition” or to “bring back 
into existence or use.”375  “Rehabilitate” means “to restore . . . to 
useful life” or “to restore to a former state or condition.”376  
“Equivalent” means “practically equal” or “having virtually identi-
cal or corresponding parts.”377 
Some commentators have formally defined recovery as “the 
return of an impacted ecosystem to its pre-spill state, structurally 
and/or functionally, within the limits and constraints of natural 
variability and statistical significance, respectively.”378  This defini-
tion is further broken down into structural recovery (“return of 
physical and chemical habitat characteristics to pre-spill conditions 
within the limits of natural variability”), functional recovery (“re-
turn of biological processes and species assemblages to pre-spill 
conditions within the limits of natural variability”), and resource 
services recovery (“return of services provided by public re-
sources . . . to pre-spill levels within the limits of expected variabil-
ity”).379 
We will follow this last approach, because we are confident 
that a resource must meet pre-spill conditions to be “recovered” 
and that there are five criteria (health, habitat, numbers, diversity, 
and ecological functions) for determining whether pre-spill condi-
tions are met.380 
 
 373. See Alan W. Maki, The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: Initial Environmental Im-
pact Assessment, 25 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 24, 29 (1991) (analyzing petroleum hy-
drocarbon levels and counting animals, thus concluding recovery is occurring); see 
also John A. Wiens, Oil, Seabirds, and Science: The Effects of the Exxon Valdez 
Oil Spill, 46 BIO-SCIENCE 587, 594 (1996) (“Recovery should instead be defined 
statistically, as the disappearance of a previously documented significant relation-
ship between a population and a measure of initial oil exposure.”). 
 374. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(5) (2000). 
 375. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1054 (2d College ed. 1982). 
 376. Id. at 1042. 
 377. Id. at 462. 
 378. Donald A. Wickham et al., Restoration: The Goal of the Oil Pollution Act 
Natural Resource Damage Actions, 45 BAYLOR L. REV. 405, 418 (1993); see also 
Heidi Wendel, Restoration as the Economically Efficient Remedy for Damage to 
Publicly Owned Natural Resources, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 430 (1991). 
 379. Wickham et al., supra note 378, at 419. 
 380. Cf. NOAA Fisheries, Viable Salmonid Populations, http://www.nwr.noaa. 
gov/1salmon/salmesa/4ddocs/4dwsvps.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2005). 
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We recognize that any attempt to define recovery using a pre-
spill baseline is inherently problematic because of “the grossly in-
adequate state of knowledge of environmental baseline condi-
tions”381 and the inability to define such a thing as “pre-injury” con-
ditions given that “change, variability, disturbance, and succession 
are parts of every environment, whether influenced by humans or 
not.”382  Therefore, whether we look for recovery by comparing 
oiled versus non-oiled area conditions or whether we attempt to 
compare pre- and post-spill indicators such as health, habitat, num-
bers, diversity, and ecological function, we may in either case find 
ourselves assuming too much (in terms of establishing the baseline) 
or questioning the causation of the changes we are observing (natu-
ral or human-made). 
The 2002 EVOS Restoration Plan Update on Injured Re-
sources and Services identifies recovery objectives for spill-
impacted resources and services.  These objectives are intended to 
be measurable conditions that signal recovery—for each of the spe-
cies and habitats of concern, the Plan uses these objectives as 
“yardsticks” to determine whether recovery has been achieved.383  
Would these same results be found using more specific indicators 
such as health, habitat, numbers, diversity, and ecological function 
for these species or communities? 
b. A Partial List: As Applied. 
(i). Orcas.  No better example of the enduring—thus sub-
stantial—ecological loss can be found than the tragedy of the tran-
sient killer whales in the AT1 pod.  Extinction, they say, is forever, 
and forever is a long time to wait for “restoration.” 
The AT1 pod of transient, mammal-eating, killer whales has 
declined by at least 50% since the Exxon Valdez spill.384  Originally 
numbering twenty-two animals, the pod currently consists of seven 
 
 381. David G. Shaw & Harry R. Bader, Environmental Science in a Legal Con-
text: The Exxon Valdez Experience, 25 AMBIO 430, 432 (1996). 
 382. Id. 
 383. UPDATE ON INJURED RESOURCES AND SERVICES, supra note 183, at 1; see 
also EVOS Trustee Council Application to the Cal. Dep’t of Water Res., Large 
Ecosystem Level Project Decision Support Systems Questionnaire, available at 
http://www.iep.water.ca.gov/cmarp/groups/dartwt/largescale/evos.doc (last visited 
Oct. 16, 2005). 
 384. Doug O’Harra, Dying Killer Whale Family Wins Protection, ANCHORAGE 
DAILY NEWS, June 4, 2004, at A1; see also News Release, NOAA Fisheries, 
NOAA Fisheries Proposes Depleted Designation for Prince William Sound Killer 
Whales (Oct. 27, 2003), http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/newsreleases/2003/AT1killer-
whale.htm. 
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whales and has not produced a viable calf in over twenty years.385  
Prior to the oil spill, the twenty-two AT1 transients had been 
sighted on an annual or biennial basis and appeared in Prince Wil-
liam Sound year-round, a sighting regularity that is rare for tran-
sient animals.386  Despite this dramatic decline—coinciding with the 
oil spill—and despite expert opinion,387 the Council insists there is 
no evidence linking the oil spill to the AT1 group’s decline.388 
Following the oil spill, several members of the AT1 group 
were photographed swimming through oiled waters near the Exxon 
Valdez.389  In a report prepared for the EVOS Trustee Council, kil-
ler whale researchers Craig Matkin and Eva Saulitis stated: 
Most of the missing AT1 whales apparently disappeared during 
the 1989-90 winter.  We suspect that they died from the pro-
tracted effects of either inhaling oil or oil vapors or as a result of 
extensive feeding on heavily oiled harbor seals.  Oiled seals were 
lethargic and may have provided an easy source of food for these 
whales following the spill.390 
Additional impacts from the oil spill may include the decline in 
harbor seals391 and the extremely high levels of contaminants found 
in the blubber of the AT1 whales.392  The contaminants consist of 
assorted PCB compounds as well as DDT and its breakdown com-
ponents;393 scientists are concerned that the contaminants will affect 
the whales’ reproductive success.  The combination of contami-
nants and the decreased prey population may prevent the AT1 
group from recovering,394 perhaps so much so that future recovery 
is impossible.395  In short, the AT1 orca pod fails all criteria for re-
 
 385. O’Harra, supra note 384, at A1.  The AT1 pod has been listed as depleted 
under the Marine Mammal Protection Act.  Id.  Reproductive failure in this pod 
preceded the spill.  See id. 
 386. CRAIG MATKIN & EVA SAULITIS, KILLER WHALE (ORCINUS ORCA) 3, 6–7 
(EVOS Trustee Council Restoration Notebook Series 1997), http://www.evostc. 
state.ak.us/pdf/mkiwh.pdf. 
 387. See id. at 10. 
 388. EVOS Trustee Council, Status of Injured Resources—Killer Whale, 
http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/facts/status_orca.html  (last visited Oct. 4, 2005). 
 389. See O’Harra, supra note 384, at A1. 
 390. MATKIN & SAULITIS, supra note 386, at 10. 
 391. See id. 
 392. See id. 
 393. Id. 
 394. See id. 
 395. O’Harra, supra note 384, at A1 (quoting Dr. James Balsiger, NOAA Fish-
eries, Alaska Regional Fisheries Administrator, “The number of animals in this 
group has dramatically decreased since 1989 to the point where this particular 
stock of killer whales may disappear from the ocean.”). 
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covery because it is on its way to extinction.  The EVOS Trustee 
Council lists the harbor seal as “not recovering.”396 The orca who 
prey on the seal are “not recovering” either.  This sad story is a re-
grettable residue of the 1989 oil spill. 
(ii). Steller Sea Lions.  The EVOS Council does not in-
clude the Steller sea lion as an “injured resource.”397  However, the 
western stock of Steller sea lions has declined drastically since the 
1970s; it is estimated the population fell 40% between 1990 and 
2000.398  The stock is listed as endangered under the Endangered 
Species Act.399  Although Prince William Sound does not contain 
rookeries (terrestrial breeding and pupping sites), there are two 
haul-out sites used year-round and three used on a seasonal basis.400  
Twenty-five more haul-outs outside of Prince William Sound were 
in the path of the oil spill.401 
Direct impacts to Steller sea lions from the oil spill appeared 
to be minimal; scientists did not find conclusive evidence of an ef-
fect from the oil spill on the population.402  Nonetheless, recent re-
search demonstrates that herring are the most important winter 
forage item for Steller sea lions in the Sound,403 and, as discussed 
below, the herring fishery has not recovered from the spill.  It is 
probable that the decline in herring availability combined with 
other ecosystem changes from the oil spill has contributed to the 
decline of the Steller sea lion in Prince William Sound—more re-
search would be required to find the causes and effects.  Nonethe-
less, it is clear the Steller sea lion population has waned and should 
be recognized as “not recovered” by the EVOS Council. 
(iii). Pacific Herring.  Pacific herring are deemed “not re-
covering” by the Trustee Council.404  This species has failed to meet 
its EVOS recovery objective: it “will have recovered when the next 
 
 396. UPDATE ON INJURED RESOURCES AND SERVICES, supra note 183, at 11. 
 397. See id. at 3. 
 398. NOAA Fisheries, 2002 Stock Assessment, Steller Sea Lion: Western U.S. 
Stock 2, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/PR2/Stock_Assessment_Program/Pinnipeds/ 
Steller_(West)/AK02stellerseallion_West.pdf. 
 399. Id at 7. 
 400. Donald G. Calkins et al., Impacts on Steller Sea Lions, in MARINE 
MAMMALS AND THE EXXON VALDEZ 119, 119–20 (Thomas R. Loughlin, ed., 1994). 
 401. Id. 
 402. Id. at 137. 
 403. See G.L. Thomas & R.E. Thorne, Acoustical-optical Assessment of Pacific 
Herring and Their Predator Assemblage in Prince William Sound, Alaska, 16 
AQUATIC LIVING RESOURCES 247, 247 (2003). 
 404. UPDATE ON INJURED RESOURCES AND SERVICES, supra note 183, at 17. 
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highly successful year-class is recruited into the population and 
when other indicators of population health (such as biomass, size-
at-age, and disease expression) are within normal bounds in Prince 
William Sound.”405 
This crucial species fails each of our five tests for recovery: (1) 
its numbers are down, (2) its habitat is poisoned, (3) its health is 
bad, (4) its distribution is limited, and (5) its diversity is in jeop-
ardy.  For these reasons, it cannot serve as the main prey item in 
many complex food webs. 
First, herring numbers are dramatically down since before the 
oil spill.  The population of spawning herring was depressed 
through 1995; in 1997 and 1998, spawning numbers doubled those 
of 1994 (the year after the crash) and suggested recovery had be-
gun.406  Limited harvests were thus permitted in 1997-1998.407  In 
1999, the EVOS Trustee Council considered Pacific herring to be 
recovering.408  Regrettably, “in the last several years the recovery 
has stalled and the population has yet to recruit a highly successful 
yearclass [sic], which is fundamental to recovery.”409  Evidence in 
2003 suggested a class of juveniles could recruit into the adult 
stocks; if these fish do not trigger a disease outbreak, they could 
start to rebuild the Sound’s herring population and again spark re-
covery.410  However, the fishery remains closed through 2006.411  Un-
til a class recruits, Pacific herring “can only be considered to be not 
recovering from the effects of the oil spill.”412 
Dr. Riki Ott has identified habitat and health factors that 
originated with the spill: 
The Sound’s herring population has had problems since the spill.  
At a minimum, oil exposure in 1989 killed lipid-rich eggs, incu-
bating along oiled beaches; maimed and killed embryos adrift in 
surface waters; and reduced fertility in survivors of the 1989 
year-class.  PAH exposure also may have wreaked havoc with 
the immune system of surviving 1989 year-class and adults, mak-
ing them more susceptible to diseases . . . . The herring stocks 
collapsed in Prince William Sound and nowhere else in the state 
in 1993, the year that survivors of the ill-fated 1989 year-class 
 
 405. Id. at 16. 
 406. Id. at 17. 
 407. Id. 
 408. Id. 
 409. Id. 
 410. Id.; see also OTT, supra note 3, at 379. 
 411. Alaska Dep’t of Fish and Wildlife, Prince William Sound Herring An-
nouncement #1, http://www.cf.adfg.state.ak.us/region2/finfish/herring/pws/pwsupd 
05.php (last visited Oct. 2, 2005). 
 412. UPDATE ON INJURED RESOURCES AND SERVICES, supra note 183, at 17. 
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matured and joined the adult stocks.  Viral outbreaks decimated 
the Sound’s remaining herring stocks again in 1998 and 2001.413 
Herring disease assessment has been conducted by the Alaska 
Department of Fish and Game (“ADFG”) since 1993.  In April 
2004, ADFG examined herring for prevalence of focal skin redden-
ing and the pathogen Ichthyophonus hoferi.414  The prevalence of 
reddening was low but the prevalence of I. hoferi was relatively 
high (14%) and consistent with the increasing age of the dominant 
1999 age-class.415  The ADFG concluded, “[I]f this trend continues, 
mortality of the dominant age class may increase significantly.”416  
Exposure to Exxon Valdez oil has been shown to compromise the 
immune systems of adult herring.417 
The herring habitat was contaminated by the spill and remains 
contaminated.  In the opinion of one herring researcher, because 
herring depend on the edge zone of Prince William Sound, “they 
will remain at risk for as long as there is toxicity from oil in that 
region.”418  The habitat for herring continues to impact this species 
negatively, due to residual oil causing instability in the plants that 
make up this habitat.419 
In short, the science shows an increased incidence of patho-
gens (and a surprising genetic disparity between Prince William 
Sound herring and other nearby herring stocks).420  This may be 
problematic.  Herring are a keystone species, whose activities and 
abundances can determine the integrity and stability of a complex 
ecosystem.421 
 
 413. OTT, supra note 3, at 379 (references omitted). 
 414. Alaska Department of Fish and Wildlife, Prince William Sound Herring 
Announcement #1, supra note 411. 
 415. Id. 
 416. Id. 
 417. See UPDATE ON INJURED RESOURCES AND SERVICES, supra note 183, at 16. 
 418. OTT, supra note 3, at 291. 
 419. See UPDATE ON INJURED RESOURCES AND SERVICES, supra note 183, at 13. 
 420. Another example of EVOS effects: In 1994, the Trustee Council commis-
sioned a four-year study of genetic differences of herring within and adjacent to 
Prince William Sound, and between year classes within and adjacent to the Sound.  
The results showed a large genetic discontinuity between herring from the Gulf of 
Alaska and the Bering Sea and between specific locations within Prince William 
Sound, the Gulf of Alaska, and the Bering Sea.  The study also revealed significant 
inter-annual variation at locations sampled in successive years within Prince Wil-
liam Sound.  See JAMES E. SEEB ET AL., GENETIC DISCRIMINATION OF PRINCE 
WILLIAM SOUND HERRING POPULATIONS FINAL REPORT 2 (1999), available at 
http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/pdf final_reports/165.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2005). 
 421. See R.T.Paine, A Note on Trophic Complexity and Community Stability, 
103 AM. NATURALIST 91, 92 (1969). 
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Few species are of greater combined ecological and economic 
importance in Prince William Sound (and in many other coastal 
ecosystems) than is the Pacific Herring . . . central to a marine 
food web that includes humpback whales, harbor seals, a large 
variety of marine and shore birds, bald eagles, jellyfish and other 
invertebrates, and an array of other fishes, such as pollock.  In 
addition, herring – especially their eggs – provide a multi-million 
dollar resource that is available to commercial fishers in the 
spring, before the main salmon seasons open.422 
The delay in recovery of Pacific herring is a likely factor in the 
delay in recovery of other species.  Reopener funds could be useful 
in finding ways to assist the herring population in recovery. 
The chief difficulty in assessing EVOS responsibility for the 
herring is the substantial natural variability in herring populations.  
This makes it “impossible” to know what a population or commu-
nity would have been like “in the absence of the spill.”423  But surely 
NRD provisions of law are not rendered inoperative by natural 
variability.  Exxon’s restoration standard of a normally functioning 
ecosystem is not met in the case of herring; it is insufficiently ambi-
tious because “judging recovery solely by criteria of ecosystem 
function minimizes the significance of specific biological detail such 
as species density and age structure.”424 
(iv). Intertidal Communities.  The EVOS Council says that 
“Intertidal Communities” are recovering in the wake of the spill425 
and has its own criteria for ascertaining full recovery.426  The inter-
tidal zone is comprised of beaches and nearshore, sub-tidal areas 
that play a vital role in maintaining the ecosystem of Prince Wil-
liam Sound.427  If this regime is not recovered—and it is not—the 
legal case for the Reopener is established. 
 
 422. See EVELYN D. BROWN & MARK G. CARLS, PACIFIC HERRING (CLUPEA 
PALLASI) 1, (EVOS Trustee Council Restoration Notebook Series 1998), 
http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/pdf/rnpahe.pdf. 
 423. R.T. Paine et al., Trouble on Oiled Waters: Lessons from the Exxon Valdez 
Oil Spill, 27 ANN. R. ECOLOGY & SYSTEMATICS 197, 205 (1996). 
 424. Id. 
 425. UPDATE ON INJURED RESOURCES AND SERVICES, supra note 183, at 13. 
 426. Id. at 12–13.  The EVOS recovery objective is that important species have 
been reestablished, “the differences in community composition and organism 
abundance on oiled and unoiled shorelines are no longer apparent . . . and the 
intertidal and nearshore habitats provide adequate, uncontaminated food supplies 
for top predators.”  Id. at 13. 
 427. OTT, supra note 3, at 202.  The intertidal rockweed and subtidal eelgrass 
and kelp forests provide food and shelter for a large variety of smaller organisms 
(e.g., small bottom-dwelling fish, mussels, snails, clams, marine worms, sea stars, 
sea urchins, small crabs, and other crustaceans).  These species serve as food for 
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Twelve years after the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the Alaska Fish-
eries Science Center conducted a study and found, quite amazingly, 
that Exxon Valdez oil was highly persistent: “Although the volume 
of oil has declined considerably, our study suggests the area of 
oiled beach has probably changed little since 1992.”428  This oil per-
sistence study found oil on seventy-eight out of ninty-one beaches 
selected randomly based on previous exposure to EVOS oil.429  The 
study evaluated an area of 11.3 hectares and estimated “conserva-
tively” that there were 55,600 kilograms of subsurface oil remain-
ing.430  “These results indicate that oil from the Exxon Valdez re-
mains by far the largest reservoir of biologically available polycyclic 
aromatic hydrocarbons on beaches impacted by the spill and that 
biota dependent on these beaches risk continued exposure.”431 
The spill impacted portions of the 1,400 mile coastline in 
Prince William Sound, on the Kenai and Alaska peninsulas, and in 
the Kodiak Archipelago.432  The flora and fauna of the intertidal 
zone suffered significant impacts from the spilled oil and the subse-
quent clean-up efforts.433  Within a few years, algal coverage and 
invertebrate populations returned to densities and abundances like 
those observed in unoiled areas.434  Despite this recovery, there con-
tinues to be large fluctuations in algal coverage in the areas im-
pacted by the oil spill.435  Specifically, Fucus gardneri populations (a 
perennial brown seaweed known as rockweed or popweed that 
dominates the intertidal) continue to be unstable as a result of the 
spill and more recent natural events.436  Additionally, through 1997, 
 
many larger predators.  In addition, the intertidal areas provide vital foraging, 
nursery, and spawning habitat for numerous aquatic, avian, and terrestrial species.  
Id. 
 428. See Jeffrey W. Short et al., Estimate of Oil Persisting on the Beaches of 
Prince William Sound 12 Years After the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 38 ENVTL. SCI. & 
TECH. 19, 24 (2004). 
 429. Id. 
 430. Id. at 19. “Analysis of terpanes indicated that over 90% of the surface oil 
and all of the subsurface oil was from the Exxon Valdez.”  Id. 
 431. Id. 
 432. See UPDATE ON INJURED RESOURCES AND SERVICES, supra note 183, at 12. 
 433. Id. 
 434. Id. at 13. 
 435. Id. 
 436. Id.; see also W.B. Driskell et al., Long Term Signal of Disturbance: Fucus 
Gardneri After the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 11 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 815 
(2001) (“Broad-scale (and probably recurrent) oscillations in Fucus cover suggest 
that authentic recovery cannot simply be defined as the reappearance of a species 
or assemblage at its former abundance.  Instead, the dynamics of the system in 
terms of both spatial and temporal variability must fall within a range of natural 
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studies have confirmed that populations of invertebrate mollusks 
and annelid worms on oiled and washed beaches are much less 
abundant than those on comparable unoiled beaches.437 
In comparing oiled sites with unoiled reference sites, scientists 
documented a reduced abundance of many species of algae and 
invertebrates in areas impacted by the spill.438  For example, the oil 
spill contributed to a reduced abundance and reproductive poten-
tial of the common seaweed, Fucus gardneri, and its place was su-
perceded by “more opportunistic” species such as barnacles, oli-
gochaete worms, and filamentous brown algae.439 
Intertidal communities are ecologically important and serve as 
subsistence resources for a variety of species, including sea and 
river otters, black oystercatchers, harlequin ducks, and pigeon guil-
lemots.440  Of critical importance to intertidal communities is the 
full recovery of Fucus gardneri populations, which provide cover 
for many invertebrate populations.441  Fucus’ recovery has been 
hindered by the unexpected persistence of subsurface Exxon Val-
dez oil in the middle and lower intertidal zones.442 
Based on the lack of full recovery of some soft-sediment inter-
tidal invertebrates and the role of residual oil in initiating Fucus 
population instability, the intertidal communities are not recov-
ered. 
(v).  Sea Otters.  Sea Otters are deemed “recovering” in 
the August 2002 Status Report.443  They are not recovered.  Though 
the total number of sea otters killed by the oil spill is unknown, 
acute loss is estimated in the range of several thousand.444  The sea 
otter population is probably increasing today in Prince William 
Sound.445  But sea otters in the most heavily oiled areas still face 
 
variation.”); R.T. Paine et al., supra note 423, at 221 (“Exxon’s assessment of Fu-
cus recovery . . . is statistically correct yet biologically flawed”). 
 437. UPDATE ON INJURED RESOURCES AND SERVICES, supra note 183, at 13. 
 438. Id. at 12. 
 439. Id. at 13. 
 440. Id. at 12. 
 441. Id. at 13. 
 442. See Short et al., supra note 428, at 25. 
 443. See UPDATE ON INJURED RESOURCES AND SERVICES, supra note 183, at 20. 
 444. Brenda E. Ballachey et al., An Overview of Sea Otter Studies, in MARINE 
MAMMALS AND THE EXXON VALDEZ 47, 56 (1994). 
 445. R.T. Paine et al., supra note 423, at 218 (“[a]lthough doubt may remain 
about the time course to recovery because of both chronic effects of oil and possi-
ble disease introduction from the intensive rehabilitation efforts”). 
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significant recovery problems.446  Knight Island, which suffered 
heavy oiling and the highest otter mortalities after the spill, showed 
no increase in the population as of 2000, due to low juvenile sur-
vival rates.447  Oil persists on the beaches and is ingested by the ot-
ters during foraging activities; “progress toward recovery . . . is evi-
dent, but that in areas where initial oil effects were greatest, recov-
ery may be constrained by residual spill effects, resulting from ele-
vated mortality and emigration.”448  Until the sea otters begin to 
recover in the areas most severely impacted by the spill, the popu-
lation should not be listed as “recovered” by the EVOS Council. 
The sea otter is a keystone species because it helps keep other 
species under control in nearshore communities.449  Given the im-
portance of the intertidal community to the health of sea otters, 
and the critical importance of sea otters in the Prince William 
Sound ecosystem, it is clear that this species cannot be considered 
fully recovered from the effects of the oil spill.  More effort needs 
to be taken to speed the otters’ resurgence. 
3. Are These Losses “As a Result” of the Oil Spill?  All losses 
depicted above—and many more not discussed here—are linked to 
the oil spill.  The Peterson study of long-term ecosystem responses 
shows how far the science of oil-spill causation has progressed since 
1989.450  For some species, lingering consequences show up as 
health effects; for others, population numbers are down.  For the 
orcas of Pod AT1, the “result” of the oil spill may very well be ex-
tinction.451 
For many species, the habitat that was lost to the oil spill re-
mains lost.  A 2004 study452 sponsored by the EVOS Trustee Coun-
 
 446. UPDATE ON INJURED RESOURCES AND SERVICES, supra note 183, at 20 
(“The lack of recovery may reflect the extended time required for population 
growth for a long-lived mammal with a low reproductive rate, but it also could 
reflect the effects of continuing exposure to hydrocarbons, or a combination of 
both factors.”). 
 447. J.L. Bodkin et al., Sea Otter Population Status and the Process of Recovery 
from the 1989 Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 241 MARINE ECOLOGY PROGRESS SERIES 
237, 250 (2002); see also R.T. Paine et al., supra note 423, at 218 (highly critical of 
the official response to the distress of sea otters: “little seems to have been learned 
of significance for the conservation, restoration, and especially management of this 
ecologically conspicuous species”). 
 448. Id. at 237. 
 449. James A. Estes & John F. Palmisano, Sea Otters: Their Role in Structuring 
Nearshore Communities, 185 SCIENCE 1058, 1059–60 (1974). 
 450. See generally Ecosystem Response, supra note 367, at 2082–86. 
 451. Id. at 2085. 
 452. Short et al., supra note 428, at 19. 
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cil “found some form of oil at 86% of the beaches [visited] and on 
93% of the combined beaches of categories I and II.”453  The study 
used a random sampling approach “to provide a quantitative, 
probability-based estimate of the amount of oil remaining.”454  The 
study sampled three categories of beaches: (I) those that were 
“heavily oiled” at any time during the period from 1990–93; (II) 
those that were “moderately oiled” at any time during the same 
period; and (III) those that were heavily oiled in 1989 but had only 
light or no oil impact during subsequent years.455  The total length 
of beach sampled was 116.6 kilometers (approximately 72.5 
miles).456  A grid was laid out on each beach tested and was 
searched visually for evidence of surface oil.457  Each oil patch was 
then classified according to types like “asphalt pavement/mousse,” 
“surface oil residue,” “tar balls,” “coat,” or “oil film.”458  Oil visu-
ally evident within the uppermost five centimeters (two inches) of a 
beach surface was considered “surface oil.”459  Test pits were dug to 
a depth of 0.5 meters (1.6 feet) to evaluate the presence of subsur-
face oil.460  Chemical analyses of oil found were compared to chemi-
cal “fingerprints” of Exxon Valdez oil, and to samples originating 
from known contamination released during the 1964 earthquake 
(“Monterey Formation” asphalt).461 
The results of the study show that the distribution of detected 
oil among the sampled beaches was highly variable.462  Segments 
that were within sheltered embayments receiving the brunt of the 
initial oil landfall were the most heavily impacted.463  Persistent oil 
was also found on beaches with surface armoring of boulder or 
cobble, nearly level slopes of the middle intertidal, or a bedrock 
platform overlaid with sediment veneer.464  Again, some form of oil 
was found at nearly 90% of the beaches visited, and on over 90% 
of the category I and II beaches.465  Surface oil was found in all 
 
 453. Id. at 22. 
 454. Id. at 19. 
 455. Id. 
 456. Id. 
 457. Id. 
 458. Id. at 20. 
 459. Id. 
 460. Id. 
 461. Id. at 22. 
 462. Id. 
 463. Id. 
 464. Id. 
 465. Id. 
110805 02_RODGERS.DOC 1/3/2006  4:49 PM 
2005] EXXON VALDEZ REOPENER 201 
three categories.466  The estimate of beach area contaminated by 
subsurface oil was 7.8 hectares (19.3 acres).467 
Subsurface oil was most often found in the lower tidal eleva-
tions of the sampling grid.468  All of the subsurface oil was consis-
tent with Exxon Valdez oil, and was usually less weathered than 
surface oil samples.469  Monterey Formation oil was usually found 
above +3 meters (9.8 ft) tide height, typically in the form of flat-
tened tar balls adhered to cobbles and boulders, or occasionally as 
small tar mats.470  Petroleum derived from the Monterey Formation 
was estimated to account for less than 10% of the surface oil en-
countered.471  The researchers did not find evidence that the oil 
found during the study originated from any other anthropogenic 
sources.472 
The study suggested it underestimated the area of oil-con-
taminated beach.473  Though the volume of oil mass has fallen, this 
study suggests that the area of oiled beach has changed only slightly 
since 1992.474  “Although the oil remaining is only about 0.14-0.28% 
of the volume originally beached, the decline was most rapid during 
the first few years.”475  Subsequent annual loss is estimated to be 20-
26%, which is “substantially slower than anticipated.”476 
4. Could the Long-Term Adverse Effects Reasonably Be An-
ticipated by the Trustees?  The state of knowledge at the time of the 
Exxon Valdez settlement is best confirmed by the actions of the 
principals; for instance, in 1991 Exxon assured Judge Holland that 
 
 466. Id. 
 467. Id. 
 468. Id. at 23. 
 469. Id. 
 470. Id. 
 471. Id. at 24. 
 472. Id. 
 473. Id. (the estimate was perhaps too low because it excluded “(i) tidal eleva-
tions lower than +1.8 m [5.9 ft], (ii) beaches described as lightly or moderately 
oiled in 1989 but not thereafter, (iii) pit depths deeper than 0.5 m [1.6 ft], and (iv) 
oil not evident visually or by odor”).  The increasing frequency of oil encountered 
from the upper (+4.8m/15.8 ft) to the mid- (+1.8 m/5.9 ft) intertidal elevation grid, 
suggests that subsurface oil may be encountered within the lower intertidal nearly 
as often as in the upper intertidal.  Id. 
 474. Id. 
 475. Id. 
 476. Id. 
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Prince William Sound was “well on the way” to recovery.477  The 
Reopener was only a hedge against the improbable.  Books would 
later be written on how nature could quickly rebound from traumas 
like the oil spill of the Exxon Valdez.478 
This confidence unraveled relatively quickly.  The cascades of 
unanticipated consequences came post-settlement, such as the 1992 
and 1993 collapse of pink salmon runs, the first population collapse 
of Pacific herring in 1993, the 2001 documentation of the extent of 
buried oil, and a number of other developments.479 
The Trustee Council has admitted that many of the long-term 
effects of the oil spill were not known (and could not have been 
known) at the time of the settlement: 
Many of the resources affected by the spill had limited or no re-
cent data on their status in 1989.  In addition, some of the avail-
able pertinent data was the result of limited sampling and had 
wide ranges in the population estimates.  Having such patchy 
data on resources made it difficult to accurately assess initial in-
jury . . . . Since the Exxon Valdez oil spill affected an area rich in 
wildlife and was so well studied, it would not be surprising that 
there are findings without precedent in the scientific literature on 
oil effects.  One example of such an unprecedented effect is the 
sensitivity of Pacific herring and pink salmon to low concentra-
tions of weathered oil.480 
Other examples are explained below.  All of them support trig-
gering the Reopener to combat the unanticipated and lingering ef-
fects of the Exxon Valdez oil spill. 
a. Lingering Unweathered Oil in the Intertidal Zone.  
The study of the persistence of oil from the Exxon Valdez oil spill 
described above is a dramatic example of an environmental impact 
 
 477. Alaska Action Network, Action Alert: 15 Years of Lingering Effects, 
http://aknetwork.e-actionmax.com/showalert.asp?aaid=590 (last visited Oct. 27, 
2005). 
 478. See, e.g., JEFF WHEELWRIGHT, DEGREES OF DISASTER: PRINCE WILLIAM 
SOUND: HOW NATURE REELS AND REBOUNDS (1994). 
 479. See, e.g., Scott Allen, Deep Problems 10 Years After Exxon Valdez, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 7, 1999, at A1 (“But the deep scars, and the unfinished 
business, of the Exxon Valdez disaster become clearer down on the water, where 
only two of the 23 most damaged species have fully recovered and an estimated 40 
percent of the fishermen suffer depression over their decimated livelihoods. . . . 
True, some animals, such as bald eagles and, later, river otters, did seem to bounce 
back quickly.  However, scientists at the National Marine Fisheries Service say 
Exxon’s claims are premature even now.  Not only are some species, such as loons 
and harlequin ducks, showing no signs of recovering, but new research suggests 
that the Exxon Valdez spill may be killing today.”). 
 480. UPDATE ON INJURED RESOURCES AND SERVICES, supra note 183, at 2. 
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that was unexpected at the time of settlement.  In the words of the 
study’s authors: “The unexpected persistence of subsurface Exxon 
Valdez oil, often only moderately weathered and extending into the 
more biologically productive middle and lower intertidal, confirms 
the potential for long-term biological effects after 1992 on beaches 
most heavily impacted by the spill.”481  Those “biological effects” 
have been most obvious in pink salmon and Pacific herring. 
b. 1992-1993 Collapse of the Pink Salmon Fishery.  Al-
though there had been record harvests of pink salmon in Prince 
William Sound in 1990, an unprecedented event occurred in the 
summer of 1991.  The adult salmon returned to the Sound, but in-
stead of returning to their birth streams or hatcheries, the fish 
milled and ripened in deep water.482  Then, during two weeks in 
August, millions of pink salmon migrated to the streams and hatch-
eries.483  This behavior was completely unexpected and over-
whelmed the fishing industry’s capacity to catch, transport, and 
process the fish.  Many of these fish likely had been exposed to oil 
either in streams in 1989 or in nearshore environments in 1990.484  
In 1992 and 1993 the pink salmon runs were exceptionally low.  The 
settlement between the federal and state governments and Exxon, 
finalized in October 1991, did not take into account the possibility 
of this type of impact on the pink salmon fishery. 
c. 1993 First Collapse of the Pacific Herring Fishery.  
Within a week of the Exxon Valdez oil spill in March 1989, Pacific 
herring and eggs deposited on beaches were exposed to the spread-
ing oil slick in open water and along the shoreline of Prince Wil-
liam Sound.485  Although egg mortality and larval deformities were 
documented, the population-level effect of these injuries was not 
clearly established.  Suddenly, in 1993, the Pacific herring popula-
tion in the Sound fell dramatically.486  In that year, Pacific herring 
suffered an outbreak of viral hemorrahagic septicemia disease and 
fungus, which is thought to have resulted from depressed immune 
response likely caused by oil exposure.487  The fish looked horrible, 
 
 481. Short et al., supra note 428, at 25.  Reports of buried oil from Alaska Na-
tives and fishers prompted these studies of oil persistence.  See OTT, supra note 3, 
at 361. 
 482. See OTT, supra note 3, at 258. 
 483. Id. 
 484. Id. 
 485. UPDATE ON INJURED RESOURCES AND SERVICES, supra note 183, at 16. 
 486. Id. 
 487. OTT, supra note 3, at 265. 
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swam around in circles, were covered with lesions, and the females 
reabsorbed their eggs.488  The herring population went from a 
twenty-year high to a twenty-year low.489 
The fact that all funding was cut for herring research in 1992 is 
evidence that this population crash was completely unexpected and 
thus an unanticipated effect at the time of the EVOS settlement.  
Though there were small harvests in 1997 and 1998, the herring 
fisheries have been closed since 1999 to allow the stocks to re-
cover.490  As a keystone species, the weak state of the herring im-
pacts the entire Prince William Sound ecosystem, as well as the 
economic health of the human community.491 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Biomass Estimates of Pacific Herring in Prince William 
Sound.  Unexploited spawning biomass projected in the year be-
fore spawning (Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Cordova) 
and calculated after spawning (best estimate) using an age-
structured assessment model modified by a disease index after 
1993. 
d. Other Unanticipated Consequences.  Since the oil spill, 
numerous unforeseen consequences related to the effect of oil on 
the marine environment have emerged.  These consequences have 
 
 488. Id. 
 489. Id. 
 490. Id. at 380. 
 491. Id. 
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led to recognition of new paradigms and calls for innovative prac-
tices to assess ecological risks from oil in the oceans.492  Most impor-
tantly, before the spill, impacts and risks from oil were believed to 
be primarily direct and short-term.493  After the Exxon Valdez spill, 
the long-term impacts are apparent, as oil has persisted in startling 
quantities and as indirect effects have caused significant damage.494  
Moreover, residual oil has been sufficiently bioavailable to induce 
long-term impacts to marine species at the population level.495 
One of the most important paradigm shifts implicated the tox-
icity of oil and the persistence of its harmful effects.  In 1999, 
twenty-two polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (“PAHs”) present in 
residual oil deposits were identified as persistent, bioaccumulative, 
and toxic pollutants (a category that includes mercury and PCBs).496  
Researchers have discovered that oil had previously unknown, per-
sistent, harmful effects to both humans and wildlife.497  “It now ap-
pears the remaining oil deposits may have become a chronic source 
of low-level oil pollution within the spill-affected area.”498 
Oil affects the environment on many levels: it can kill marine 
organisms, reduce their fitness through sublethal impacts, and dis-
rupt the functioning of marine ecosystems.499  Again, impacts from 
oil on the marine habitat and species were originally believed to be 
short-term and caused by acute exposure.500 
In contrast, recent research recognizes both acute and chronic 
effects even at low concentrations of oil, as well as impacts at the 
population level.  A 2003 National Research Council study direly 
describes the toxic effects of petroleum hydrocarbons as follows: 
“Impairment of behavioral, developmental, and physiological 
 
 492. Ecosystem Response, supra note 367, at 2082. 
 493. OTT, supra note 3, at 393. 
 494. Ecosystem Response, supra note 367, at 2082. 
 495. Id. at 2083. 
 496. OTT, supra note 3, at 388. 
 497. Id.  For an overview of impacts on human health, see id. at 389–92.  PAHs 
are persistent in the environment, building up in biological tissues (human and 
animal), causing reproductive and developmental harm, central nervous system 
problems, cancers, and genetic impacts.  Id. at 388–96. 
 498. NOAA Fisheries, The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: How Much Oil Remains?, 
http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/Quarterly/jas2001/feature_jas01.htm (AFSC Quarterly 
Research Report 2001) (last visited Oct. 27, 2005). 
 499. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, OIL IN THE SEA III: INPUTS, FATES, AND 
EFFECTS 120 (2003). 
 500. Compare NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, OIL IN THE SEA 392 (1985) (“[i]t is 
important to reemphasize that significant reproductive impairment in oiled field 
conditions has seldom been observed”) with NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, OIL IN 
THE SEA III, supra note 499, at 120–21. 
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processes may occur at concentrations significantly lower than 
acutely toxic levels; such responses may alter the long-term survival 
of affected populations.”501  Oil is harmful to fish and wildlife at 
levels 1,000 times lower than those thought in the 1970s to be the 
toxic thresholds.502  Recognition of oil’s unforeseen effects has con-
tributed to changes in thinking related to shoreline habitat, oil tox-
icity to marine animals, and oil’s impact on coastal communities.503 
First, regarding physical shoreline habitat, the old paradigm 
held that oil on shores (other than marshes) would be rapidly dis-
persed, degraded microbially, and “weathered” by ultraviolet light 
(photolysis).504  The emerging paradigm suggests that oil degrades 
at different rates depending on the environment, and that “subsur-
face sediments physically protected from disturbance, oxygenation, 
and photolysis retain[] contamination . . . for years.”505 
Regarding fish toxicity, the old paradigm held that oil effects 
occurred only through short-term (approximately four days) expo-
sure at parts per million concentrations.506  The emerging paradigm 
suggests that fish embryos exposed to parts per billion of weath-
ered oil “will show population impacts through indirect effects on 
growth, deformities, and behavior with long-term impacts on mor-
tality and reproduction.”507 
Regarding marine mammals and seabirds, the old paradigm 
held that oil impacts occurred solely through short-term acute ex-
posure and caused death from hypothermia, drowning, or poison-
ing by oil ingestion during preening.508  The emerging paradigm 
suggests that substantial effects occur over the long term, due to 
chronic toxic exposure from contaminated prey, through interac-
tions between environmental stressors and the compromised health 
of exposed animals, and through disruption of reproductive behav-
ior in socially organized species.509 
Finally, regarding coastal communities, the old paradigm held 
that significant losses of shoreline plants and invertebrates only oc-
curred through short-term toxic exposure to oil deposited at the 
shore or shallow seafloor, or via smothering.510  The new paradigm 
 
 501. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, OIL IN THE SEA III, supra note 499, at 125. 
 502. OTT, supra note 3, at 413. 
 503. Ecosystem Response, supra note 367, at 2085. 
 504. Id. 
 505. Id. 
 506. Id. 
 507. Id. 
 508. Id. 
 509. Id. 
 510. Id. 
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reflects an understanding that clean-up efforts may be more dam-
aging than the oil itself, with impacts continuing for the duration of 
the clean-up and with indirect impacts that may expand the injury 
well beyond initial direct losses.511 
5. Restoration Projects Are Identifiable and Can Be Set Forth 
in a Restoration Plan. 
a. National Research Council Study and Other Projects.  
We believe the first thing the EVOS Trustee Council should do is 
hire the National Research Council (“NRC”) to develop a long-
term oil spill restoration plan for Prince William Sound.  The NRC 
can bring to bear top scientific expertise and spell out the particu-
lars needed for a Reopener Restoration Plan (as required by the 
settlement). 
There is no shortage of ideas the NRC could be asked to re-
view.  The EVOS Trustee Council has completed hundreds of stud-
ies assessing and monitoring the recovery of species and ecosystems 
of Prince William Sound.512  The Council should hire the NRC to 
evaluate the Sound’s situation, review the studies to date, and help 
formulate a restoration plan.  NRC can develop an informed opin-
ion about the effectiveness of projects undertaken and what actions 
should be continued, in addition to contributing new ideas. 
The NRC should also be asked to comment on the vast num-
ber of species that have not been priorities of the Council.  The 
Council’s Summary of Restoration Strategies and Projects lists only 
twenty-two species.513  Due to the interconnectedness of marine 
ecosystems, a broader look by the NRC would be appropriate. 
The NRC is often called the “Supreme Court of Science,” and 
it has completed studies on thousands of complex scientific topics 
since its establishment in Abraham Lincoln’s administration.  It 
borders on the bizarre for the EVOS Trustee Council to choose the 
Integral Corporation over the NRC for its swan-song studies.  This 
confirms suspicions that the EVOS Trustee Council underestimates 
the remaining work. 
In a January 2002 letter to Governor Knowles, Exxon’s Chief 
Executive Officer said he was “troubled” by the suggestion that 
there were grounds for invoking the Reopener, because he did not 
see any restoration projects that had not been implemented for 
 
 511. Id. 
 512. E.g., EVOS Trustee Council, Summary of Strategies and Projects 2003, 
http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/restoration/index.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2005). 
 513. Id. (also listing human services such as “passive use” and “subsistence”). 
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lack of funding; in fact, there was (and still is) a cash reserve.514  In 
the letter, Exxon advanced two ideas: (1) all the environment needs 
is a few good projects of limited scope, duration, and cost; and (2) 
the EVOS Council is an efficient and effective means of fulfilling 
the NRD mandate of the Clean Water Act (to restore, rehabilitate, 
or acquire the equivalent) and completing those projects.  Taking 
the company at its word, there are a number of possible roads to be 
pursued; the cash reserve and additional funds could quickly be put 
to use. 
Alaska citizens have ideas.  For instance, Rick Steiner of the 
Coastal Coalition has urged a herring buy-back program.515  Buying 
all commercial herring fishing permits would boost the herring 
population by preventing depopulation.516  Even at pre-spill prices, 
the Coastal Coalition estimates that the permits could be purchased 
for a total cost of $30 million.517  The price of a permit has dropped 
from around $300,000 to $28,000 since the spill;518 fishers could rea-
sonably be expected to accept the offer, and the purchase costs 
might be even lower than this estimate. 
Another viable project would be to identify marine protected 
areas and establish a system to monitor them; all that would need 
to be acquired is an administrative infrastructure—boats, and the 
people to run them.  Marine Protected Areas (“MPAs”) or marine 
reserves (“no-take” areas) are increasingly recognized as effective 
management tools to preserve and restore marine resources.519  Po-
tential benefits of marine reserves include: enhancing reproductive 
potential of marine species, maintaining species diversity, preserv-
ing habitat and ecosystem function, and supporting fisheries.520  Ma-
rine reserves benefit not only the ecosystem within them but also 
generate a spillover effect into adjacent areas.521  Studies demon-
strate that the size and abundance of exploited species increase in 
 
 514. Letter from L.R. Raymond, Chairman & CEO, Exxon Mobil Corp., to 
Gov. Tony Knowles, State of Alaska (Jan. 25, 2002) (on file with author). 
 515. Gay, supra note 162, at B1. 
 516. Id. 
 517. Id. 
 518. 60 Minutes: Ten Years Later, supra note 249. 
 519. E.g., STEPHEN R. PALUMBI, PEW OCEANS COMM’N, MARINE RESERVES: A 
TOOL FOR ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT AND CONSERVATION (2002), 
http://www.pewtrusts.com/pdf/pew_oceans_marine_reserves.pdf. 
 520. See Lydia K. Bergen & Mark H. Carr, Establishing Marine Reserves: How 
Can Science Best Inform Policy?, ENV’T, Mar. 2003, at 8, 10–11. 
 521. Id. at 11. 
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areas adjacent to marine reserves, and other evidence demonstrates 
that reserves also replenish larger regional populations.522 
MPAs and marine reserves could be used as restoration pro-
jects to assess recovery from the Exxon Valdez oil spill, as well as 
to limit ongoing damage from human impacts.  These are flexible 
options that can be tailored to the desired restoration goal.  For 
instance, no-take marine reserves could be designated as permit-
only scientific research.  MPAs could be designated to permit only 
subsistence use.  MPAs could be designated in state waters (within 
three miles of the coastline) and managed by the state and Alaska 
Native organizations.  An ecosystem management approach could 
also be implemented, via designation of MPAs or marine reserves 
in conjunction with terrestrial protected areas. 
b. A Perpetual “Stewardship” for Alaska Natives.  The 
EVOS Trustee Council could be replaced by a Perpetual Steward-
ship Council, in which Alaska Natives would have a strong voice.  
The Natives were hardest hit and least represented in the frantic 
response to the spill.523  They will live with the consequences for the 
foreseeable future.  “They promised us that when they left they 
would leave it as clean as before the oil hit,” says Gail Evanoff, 
now the village president of Chenega Bay.524  “I’m sorry, but those 
are extremely dirty beaches out there, and life continues to die be-
cause of that oil on the beaches.”525 
Reopener funds could make it possible for the Natives to do 
for themselves what no promises have done for them.  An ongoing 
administrative structure is necessary to carry restoration into the 
future.  Some entity will have to oversee continuation of the EVOS 
studies, establishment of marine preserves, distribution of buy-back 
monies (if that is undertaken), and new duties of monitoring, over-
sight, and restoration. 
Over the years, the Natives have fought furiously (to little 
avail) for a stronger voice on the EVOS Trustee Council.  A 2004 
paper by the Chugach Regional Resources Commission insists 
there have been no studies on the “impacts of this technological 
 
 522. PALUMBI, supra note 519, at 27.  Replenishment occurs both through spill-
over of adults or juveniles out of reserves, as well as through the export of larvae 
or eggs that drift from the reserve to adjacent areas.  Id. 
 523. The Chenega Bay Native community, whose name is embedded in the 
legal fallout of the oil spill, has seen its population plummet to forty-two—less 
than half the pre-spill number.  See George Lewis, Alaska Lives with an Unwanted 
Legacy, MSNBC, Mar. 24, 1999, http://msnbc.com/news/252495. 
 524. Id. 
 525. Id. 
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disaster to the Tribes and Native Communities from their perspec-
tive.”526  Disruption was enormous at the outset (harvest losses in 
the first year following the spill were up to 77%)527 and the injury 
has not healed.  Community involvement was not a successful pro-
gram from the Native point of view.528  In 1999, the Council adopted 
a “recovery objective” for subsistence (that was not met then and 
has not been met now): 
Subsistence will have recovered when injured resources used for 
subsistence are healthy and productive and exist at prespill lev-
els.  In addition, there is recognition that people must be confi-
dent that the resources are safe to eat and that the cultural val-
ues provided by gathering, preparing, and sharing food need to 
be reintegrated into community life.529 
The Gulf Ecosystem Monitoring (“GEM”) program is the 
wind-down project for the EVOS Trustee Council.530  Native 
“community involvement” has wound down with it.  This lapse was 
identified in a review of GEM by the National Research Council, 
which recommended strengthening “community involvement” in 
the way it is understood by the Natives.531  This recommendation of 
a prestigious science advisory committee, in turn, is viewed as a 
“window of opportunity for the tribes to pursue their idea of estab-
lishing their endowment titled Tribal Ecosystem Stewardship Pro-
gram.”532  This tribal endowment has been formalized as follows: 
The 20 communities affected by the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill are 
proposing that the EVOS Trustee Council establish an endow-
ment of $20 million to ensure meaningful Tribal and community 
involvement in the GEM research and monitoring projects and 
programs.  Such an endowment will assist in promoting commu-
nity-based scientific research and monitoring of the traditional 
natural resources on a continuous long term basis.  This program 
will also serve as a forum for western science to gain valuable 
traditional ecological knowledge about the resources, and for the 
community members to learn more about the language and in-
 
 526. Id. at 1. 
 527. See id. at 4 (citing JAMES A. FALL, SUBSISTENCE USES OF FISH AND 
WILDLIFE BEFORE AND AFTER THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL (1996)); see also 
LEE STRATTON, RESOURCE HARVEST AND USE IN TATITLEK, ALASKA (Alaska 
Dep’t of Fish & Game Technical Paper No. 181, 1990) (a fortuitous “baseline” 
paper discussing pre-spill (1988) use of 75 kinds of resources in Tatitlek, a town 
four miles from “ground zero” on Bligh Reef). 
 528. See Brown-Schwalenberg, supra note 141, at 8–17. 
 529. UPDATE ON INJURED RESOURCES AND SERVICES, supra note 183, at 27. 
 530. See Brown-Schwalenberg, supra note 141, at 14–16 (describing GEM). 
 531. Id. at 17–18 (describing the Committee to Review the Gulf of Alaska Eco-
system Monitoring program (“ROGEM”)). 
 532. Id. at 18. 
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tent of science and to receive certified technical on-the-job train-
ing in natural resource stewardship techniques.533 
 
The recommendation for a Perpetual Stewardship Council for 
Alaska Natives is not some impossible dream.  The institution of 
NRD trustees is a work in progress.  The EVOS Trustee Council 
was not prescribed by hard law in the halls of Congress; it was—
figuratively at least—made up in settlement negotiations and made 
real by incorporation into the 1991 settlement.  This same kind of 
creative reality must be pursued into the future of Prince William 
Sound. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
We believe the case for the Reopener is made.  We hope the 
responsible governments for the State of Alaska and the United 
States ask the court to order Exxon to pay $100 million.  Failing 
that, we urge Native entities to intervene in the case and seek en-
forcement of the Reopener.  Whether it arrives by court order or 
future settlement, we foresee a future for Prince William Sound 
made better by the resources that were legally committed to that 
purpose. 
 
 533. Chugach Regional Res. Comm’n, Tribal Ecosystem Stewardship Program: 
An Endowment for Tribal Involvement in the GEM Program (undated proposal, 
on file with author). 
